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ZEALOUS ADMINISTRATION:
THE DEPORTATION BUREAUCRACY

Robert Knowles and Geoffrey Heeren*

ABSTRACT

An agency's culture shapes its lawmaking. Under certain
conditions, agency culture dominates decision-making so

strongly that it mutes the influence of those factors that
administrative law scholars have traditionally focused onincluding presidential will, judicial oversight, internal
resistance, and public opinion. We call this undertheorized
phenomenon "zealousadministration."

The immigrationenforcement bureaucracyhas vast discretion
to remove unauthorized immigrants from the United States.
Current immigration policies-such as indiscriminate

deportation, family separation, and harsh detention-represent
the most prominent example of zealous administration in the
federal government. This Article focuses on that bureaucracy to

plumb the causes and effects of zealous administration and to
explore ways to limit it.
Zealous administration manifests in three principal ways.
First, the agency engages in hyper-regulation-the exercise of
authority in indiscriminate,pervasive, and performative modes.
Second, the agency is politically resilient-it is uniquely
impervious to influence from the President, pressure from other
government entities, public disapproval, and internal dissent.

Third, zealous administration-onceit has taken root in an
agency and absent some powerful intervention-will grow over

* Robert Knowles is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore
School of Law. Geoffrey Heeren is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Idaho
College of Law. We must thank Carolina Ndnez, Michael Kagan, Mike Pappas, Ming Hsu
Chen, Sarah Lamdan, Eunice Lee, Sarah Rogerson, Carrie Rosenbaum, Mark Graber,
Natalie Ram, Will Hubbard, Colin Starger, and Marc Falkoff, as well as participants in the
Maryland Junior Scholarship Workshop and the Emerging Immigration Scholars
Conference. We also thank Calvin Riorda for helpful research assistance.
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time and coopt for its mission other agencies sharing the same
regulatory space.

The immigration enforcement bureaucracy's zealous
administration complements President Trump's aggressive
agenda, but it is not merely a product of it. Zealous
administration in that bureaucracy has deep structural roots
long predating the current administration.Neither the reigning
presidential-controlview of administrative lawmaking, nor the
alternativedeliberative-democraticview can fully account for it.
This Article fills the gap by drawing on classic public choice
theory to construct a model of immigration enforcement as
regulation. It concludes that taming zealous administration
requires policymakers to focus on redirecting bureaucratic
incentives, redesigning institutions, and expanding judicial
review.
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INTRODUCTION

The Trump administration has taken an exceptionally aggressive
approach to immigration enforcement. But there is a deeper phenomenon
at work driving that enforcement, which long predates the
administration and will outlast it. Consider the story of Boguslaw

Fornalik.
In the late 1990s, the Chicago District Office of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) was trying to deport Fornalik, a Polish
teenager.1 He sought to prevent this by filing a petition with the INS's
Vermont Service Center, arguing that he qualified for an immigration
benefit under the Violence Against Women Act because he had been
abused by his father. 2 The Vermont Service Center granted his petition,
awarding him "deferred action"-a form of prosecutorial discretion not to
deport him. 3
But the INS Chicago Office kept pursuing the deportation, arguing
that its decision should prevail over the Vermont Service Center's.4 A

"baffled" Seventh Circuit disagreed: "[T]he last we checked, the INS is
one unified agency of the federal government, not a mare's nest of
competing and autonomous actors."5
Yet a "mare's nest of competing and autonomous actors" is exactly
what the immigration bureaucracy was. It contained INS agents charged
with enforcement who were deportation zealots-single-mindedly

focused on deporting non-citizens regardless of whether they were
teenagers or had been abused by a parent. 6 And it also contained benefit

adjudicators, whose job it was to consider just such facts. When the two
came into conflict, the agency lawyers insisted that the enforcers'

decisions should control.
And the enforcers did ultimately come to dominate, thanks in part to
Congress. Not long after Fornalik,the Homeland Security Act (HSA) split

1. Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 529.
5. Id.
6. For a taxonomy of bureaucratic official types, including mission "zealots," see
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (RAND Corp., Paper No. P-2963, 1964), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P2963.html.

We do not argue that zealous administration

results merely from the predominance of mission zealots within an agency. Other
institutional and legal factors are important contributors. See JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 68, 173 (1991)

[hereinafter WILSON, BUREAUCRACY] ("People matter, but organization matters also, and
tasks matter most of all."); Part II infra.
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the INS into separate enforcement and service parts-United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE)-both housed in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), a colossal agency with a counterterrorism
mission.7 Now the enforcers and service providers were part of a larger
bureaucracy with a law enforcement outlook and a national security
mandate. The trend within the immigration bureaucracy prioritizing

enforcement over service accelerated.
What Fornalik and subsequent trends reveal is that the most
8
consequential forms of immigration regulation are the product of neither
9
"presidential administration" nor deliberation among agencies and

branches.10 Instead, they emerge directly from the bureaucratic culture
of immigration enforcement-a mission-centered culture shaped over
11
decades by a confluence of institutional and political factors. We call
this form of lawmaking zealous administration.

7. See 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2019); infra Part I.A. Federal customs and border control
functions were consolidated in a third DHS agency, Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
We focus primarily on ICE in this Article because it shares far more regulatory space with
USCIS, and in that space the contrast between their missions, cultures, and functions is
most apparent. Nonetheless, as we discuss in Part I, infra, the CBP's immigration
enforcement activities are carried out by a bureaucracy with virtually the same mission,
incentives, and culture as ICE. CBP and ICE are, in this respect, bureaucratic identical
twins, and most of the conclusions we draw about ICE are applicable to CBP as well.
8. Immigration enforcement may not seem like regulation at first glance, but there
are many good reasons to conceive it as such. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime,
52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 722 (2005) (analyzing prosecutors' offices as agencies and applying
administrative law principles accordingly); Robert Knowles, Warfare as Regulation, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) [hereinafter Knowles, Warfare] (modeling U.S. national
security activities as forms of regulation and applying administrative law principles);
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 91 (2016) ("Police
agencies should be governed by the same administrative principles that govern other
agencies.").
9. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-32
(2001) (describing increased presidential coordination of agency decision making and
concluding that it enhances transparency and responsiveness to the public). This
presidential-control model has been highly influential in administrative law scholarship.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 53
(2006); Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential
Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 47-49 (2017).
10. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and
Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1178 (2016) (arguing for "mechanisms to promote
greater coordination, learning, and deliberation among actors at all levels of the
[immigration] bureaucracy").
11. We share this view with a handful of other scholars who have argued that these
models are a poor fit for the immigration bureaucracy and have drawn on public choice
insights in doing so. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of
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Zealous administration has three principal qualities. The first is
hyper-regulation-the exercise of legal authority in indiscriminate,
pervasive, and performative ways. 12 Because agencies face resource
constraints, their hyper-regulation typically involves zeroing in on only a
portion of their statutory mandate, while neglecting the remainder. 13
Indeed, ICE has engaged in hyper-regulation of immigrants and
correspondingly tepid regulation of other entities it has a mandate to
pursue, such as employers and traffickers. 14 Through its enforcement
patterns and internal policies, ICE has developed practices that are
indiscriminate: 15 it treats all eleven million unauthorized immigrants as

equally eligible for deportation. 16 These practices have become pervasive
to the point that ICE makes arrests and raids in formerly safe locations

like schools and courts, 17 conducts operations in disguise, 18 uses U.S.
Immigration Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 84-85 (2012) (discussing the limits of the
presidential control model); Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers:The Administrative Law
Struggle Behind President Obama's Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 689
(2016); Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals?Discretion, Sorting, andBureaucraticCulture in
the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 199 (2014) (emphasizing
the importance of bureaucratic incentives).
12. The term and definition are our own. But cf. Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1258 (2019) (referring to ICE's
current policies as "hyper-enforcement").
13. See infra Section II.C.1.
14. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Tensions and Trade-Offs: ProtectingTrafficking Victims in
the Eraof ImmigrationEnforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1623-24 (2010); Stephen Lee,
Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1120 (2011); infra Section
I.C.1.
15. The trend toward indiscriminate enforcement was briefly disrupted by Obama
administration efforts to require ICE to exercise more discretion, but such efforts were late
in coming, firmly resisted by the bureaucracy, and quickly abandoned under Trump. See
Kagan, supra note 11, at 667; infra Section I.C.1. Law enforcement agencies create new
primary rules of conduct when they shift enforcement patterns. See Mila
Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 34 (2017). This is a form of administrative law
creation. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, InternalAdministrative Law, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1239, 1244-45 (2017) (arguing that "many internal measures" have the
"paradigmatic features of legal norms even if they lack the element of enforcement through
independent courts").
16. See Jason A. Cade, JudicialReview of Disproportionate(or Retaliatory)Deportation,
75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1439-41 (2018); infra Section I.C.1.
17. Stephen Rex Brown, Courthouse Arrests of Immigrants by ICE Agents Have Risen
900% in New York this Year: Immigrant Defense Project, NY DAILY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-yorklice-courthouse-arrests-immigrants-900-n-y-2017article-1.3633463; Ted Sherman, AG Criticizes ICE Arrests of Immigrants as Kids Were
Going to School, NJ.COM (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nj.com/news/2018/01/
agcriticizesice_arrests_of immigrants _as_kids_we.html.
18. Nausicaa Renner, As Immigrants Become More Aware of Their Rights, ICE Steps
Up Ruses and Surveillance, INTERCEPT (July 25, 2019, 12:09 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2019/07/25/ice-surveillance-ruse-arrests-raids/.
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citizens as bait to capture their undocumented relatives, 19 and retaliates
against those who resist its policies. 20 And these rules are performative
in that their purpose is to send a message to both immigrant communities

and pro-enforcement political constituencies. 21 When ICE separates
families, detains immigrants in harsh conditions, and deports them to

countries where they face life-threatening dangers, it aims to deter
22
unauthorized immigration and encourage "self-deportation." But it also

aims to send a message to the public that it is doing everything possible
to ensure that "breaking the law" will not be tolerated. 23 In other words,
2
the cruelty is the point. 4

The second major quality of zealous administration is political
resilience-a special imperviousness to presidential influence, public
opinion, and internal dissent. Hyper-regulation by immigration
25
enforcement agencies accelerated during the Trump administration.
But this was not an example of "presidential administration": it required

no wrangling of the bureaucracy. 26 The trend toward hyper-regulation

19. Ryan Devereaux, Documents Detail ICE Campaign to ProsecuteMigrantParentsas
Smugglers, INTERCEPT (Apr. 29, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://theinterept.com/2019/04/29/icedocuments-prosecute-migrant-parents-smugglers/.

20. See Cade, supra note 16, at 1442-43.
21. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights,
64 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1478-79 (2017) (noting the performative nature of some
immigration enforcement policies). Performative enforcement is rooted in moral educative
theories of punishment. See 0. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV.
1195, 1261-63 (2011).
22. Within DHS, this is known as "consequence delivery." Nick Miroff, ICE Air:
Shackled Deportees, Air Freshenerand Cheers. America's One-Way Trip Out, WASH. POST
(Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ice-air-shackled-deportees-airfreshener-and-cheers-americas-one-way-trip-out/2019/08/10/bc5d2d36-babe-11 e9-aeb2-a10
lalfb27a7_story.html?arc404=true ("If migrants who cross illegally are released directly
into the United States, more will come. If deportations are swift and certain, fewer will
try."). It is one strain of a broader strategy known as "attrition through enforcement,"
holding that the level of unauthorized immigration will drop when all immigrants feel that
their status is precarious. Amanda Frost, Alienating Citizens, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE
48, 60 (2019), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/voll14/issl/5. But the
concept of self-deportation has long percolated through the immigration enforcement
bureaucracy. See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1884-85
(2019) (discussing the long history of the concept).
23. See Miroff, supra note 22 (quoting the Acting Director of ICE, who stated that "[o]ur
job is to enforce the law" and that, "it's up to Congress to make the laws or change the
laws").

24. See Adam Serwer, The Cruelty Is the Point, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/the-cruelty-is-the-point/572104/.
25. See infra Section I.C.I.
26. See infra Section II.C.1; Jennifer M. Chacon, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130
HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 244 (2017) ("[President Trump's] bombastic enforcement promises,
when combined with seeming indifference to certain constitutional rights and
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had already begun decades earlier. 27 ICE and its bureaucratic twin,
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), had already demonstrated,
during the Obama administration, a significant capacity to resist
presidential policies that attempted to impose limits on their discretion. 28
What has become more apparent during the Trump administration

is the third quality of zealous administration-mission cooptation, which
we define as the tendency of an agency conducting zealous
administration to convert to its mission other agencies with different
missions sharing the same regulatory space. 29 As we discuss below, ICE
and CBP have successfully encouraged other parts of the immigration
bureaucracy with a traditional service orientation to pivot toward law
enforcement tasks. 30 But this mission cooptation long predates the

Trump administration: critics of the INS had complained about it as early
as the 1990s. 31
Zealous administration occurs outside the immigration context, too.32
But we focus on that context here for three reasons. First, the stakes are
very high. The immigration enforcement apparatus constitutes the
largest federal law enforcement body, with a budget bigger than all
others combined. 33 About 13% of the U.S. population is foreign-born, a

administrative realities, have apparently encouraged agents at the lowest administrative
levels to exercise their own power in a manner insufficiently constrained by law.").

27. See infra Section I.C.
28. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 666-67; Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness:
Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 103-04 (2014)
(concluding from a study of the DHS's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties that it is
inherently difficult to induce agencies to execute both a primary mission and constraints
on that mission).

29. Cf. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness
and TransformativePolitics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (2007) (defining "legal cooptation"
as "a process by which the focus on legal reform narrows the causes" and, inter alia, "diverts
energies away from more effective and transformativealternatives").
30. See infra Section I.C.2. The influence of President Trump and his advisors also
played a role in mission cooptation. See Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, The Advisor Who
Scripts Trump's Immigration Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2019) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/stephen-miller-trump-immigration/

(dis-

cussing Trump advisor Stephen Miller's jawboning immigration bureaucrats).
31. Demetrios Papademetriou, T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Deborah Waller Meyers,
Reorganizing the Immigration Function: Toward a New Framework for Accountability, 75
No. 14 INTERPRETER RELEASES 501, 504 (1998) (referring to complaints that the law
enforcement mission had "infect[ed]" service components of the INS).
32. See, e.g., Knowles, Warfare, supra note 8, at 2012-19 (discussing the political
insularity of the national security state and its tendency to overregulate).
33. DORIS MEISSNER & JULIA GELATT, EIGHT KEY U.S. IMMIGRATION POLIcY ISSUES:
STATE OF PLAY AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 3 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/

sites/default/files/publications/Immigrationssues2019_Final_WEB.pdf.
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quarter of that number undocumented. 34 Immigration enforcement
profoundly affects millions of U.S. citizens-many of them childrenwith non-citizen family members. 35 Like the Environmental Protection

Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, or the National Transportation
Safety Board, the immigration bureaucracy's activities ultimately affect
every community in America.36
Second, the U.S. immigration enforcement bureaucracy has an
37
especially influential role in creating law. The vast discretion granted
it by Congress largely determines the fate of eleven million unauthorized
immigrants. 3 8 And when that bureaucracy adjudicates and makes rules,
it relies heavily on the informal end of the spectrum, which pushes

lawmaking to the bottom rungs. 39 The metes and bounds of immigration
enforcement law accrete from often-secret internal guidance memos and
40
the day-to-day decisions of front-line and mid-level bureaucrats.
Without understanding agency culture and bureaucratic incentives,

policymakers cannot focus their efforts on the most effective mechanisms
of change. 41
Third, the structural features of the immigration bureaucracy both

provide fertile ground for the mission cooptation aspect of zealous

34. See Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (June
17, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/key-findings-about-u-s-immig
rants/. The foreign-born share of the U.S. population reached its peak in 1890 at 14.8%. See
id.
35. See Jennifer M. Chacon, ProducingLiminal Legality, 92 DENY. U. L. REV. 709, 71112 (2015) (observing that even U.S. citizens and those with legal status experience the
instability produced by immigration enforcement policies).
36.

See DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL

IN AMERICA 1 (2009) ("Nations define themselves through the official selection and control
of foreigners seeking permanent residence on their soil.").
37. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION:
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7-13 (2015).

38.

THE

ROLE

OF

See id.; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand Immigration Law

Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 133-35 (2015).
39. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 135; see also infra Section I.C.1.
40. For example, the official move of ICE toward indiscriminate enforcement came
about because of a memo from the Executive Associate Director of ICE, a position several
levels below the cabinet level DHS Secretary. See, e.g., Memorandum from Matthew T.
Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to All ERO
Employees (Feb. 21, 2017) (on file with the Rutgers U. L. Rev.). However, that official
statement was preceded by a variety of actions on the ground level demonstrating a
commitment to such a policy, such as the lawsuit filed by the ICE Employees' Union against
Obama administration efforts to limit enforcement. See infra Section I.C.1.
41. See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6; Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 925 (2005) (emphasizing that
"predictions about the behavior of government institutions ought to rest on plausible
accounts of the interests of individual officials who direct these institutions").

2020]

ZEALOUS ADMINISTRATION

757

administration and make it more visible. 42 The enforcement arms, ICE
and CBP, are located in the DHS and share its national security
mission. 43 But DHS also houses USCIS, which adjudicates immigration
benefits.4 4 This structure helps enable ICE to coopt USCIS for its mission
and priorities even when they are in conflict with USCIS's own mission
and institutional interests. 45 Moreover, signs abound that immigration
agencies in other departments, like Justice and State, have, with White
House prodding, also been coopted for ICE's enforcement mission. 46

The complex and changing structure of the immigration
bureaucracy-and how it came to enable zealous administration-is the
subject of Part I of this Article. In Part II, having found the presidential
control and deliberation models of administrative lawmaking a poor fit
for immigration enforcement, we introduce a new model of internal
immigration enforcement as regulation, drawing on insights from classic

public choice theory. 47 We find, counter-intuitively, that an agency is
more likely to engage in zealous administration when its mission is
broadly defined: this encourages mid-level and low-level bureaucrats to
zero in on only that small portion of the agency's statutory mandate that

enhances agency autonomy and produces the greatest reputational
payoff. 48 Zealous administration is also more likely when an agency's
rulemaking and adjudication are informal, opaque, and subject to very
limited judicial review. 49 Further contributing factors include a national
security mandate and vast enforcement discretion.50

42.
43.
44.

See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A.4.

45.

See infra Section I.C.2.

46. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication,
93 TUL. L. REV. 707, 709-12 (2019) (describing the "symbiosis" between DHS and the DOJ's
immigration agency, Executive Office for Immigration Review); Melissa del Bosque,
Immigration Officials Use Secretive Gang Databases to Deny Migrant Asylum Claims,
PROPUBLICA (July 8, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/immigration-officials-usesecretive-gang-databases-to-deny-migrant-asylum-claims

(describing

coordination

between the State Department and ICE agents to collect secret intelligence used in
deportations).
47. See Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 24 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne

Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) ("[T]he crucial unifying thread in public choice theory is the
assumption that all actors in political life . . . behave rationally to maximize or optimize
some objective function (wealth, status, power)."). Public choice theory first emerged, in
part, from critiques of zealous, over-regulating bureaucrats at federal agencies. See infra
Part II.A.
48. See infra Section II.C.1.
49. See infra Section II.C.3.
50. See infra Section II.C.1.
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In Part III, we offer proposals for how to limit zealous administration
and, by doing so, encourage agency action that fully reflects its statutory
mandate. There are no easy solutions, but we discuss several changes
that could help-agency realignment, strengthened judicial review, and

restrictions on the private contractors whose lobbying amplifies the
power of zealous bureaucrats.
I. THE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BUREAUCRACY

This Part appraises the structural features and history of the U.S.
immigration bureaucracy that have created the conditions for zealous
administration. The legal scholarship on immigration enforcement has

discussed this history, but it has not sufficiently emphasized the
51
importance of agency structure and culture.
Drilling down on these key drivers of agency behavior is a critical
project for understanding immigration enforcement law because the

agencies largely create the law. As in other regulatory spaces,
congressional grants of broad discretion leave much immigration
52
lawmaking to the executive. Immigration law is therefore uniquely a
53
"creature of administrative law." Congress makes significant updates
54
to the immigration code once in a generation, but, in the interim, the
agency molds immigration law through its interpretations and practices,
55
and courts have given special deference to these agency actions.

51.

See,

e.g.,

ROBERT

A.

KATZMANN,

REGULATORY

BUREAUCRACY

7

(1980)

("Organizational arrangements have much to do with determining how power is distributed
among participants in the decisionmaking process, the manner in which information is
gathered, the types of data that are collected, the kinds of policy issues that are discussed,
the choices that are made, and the ways in which decisions are implemented."). A key
exception is Nina Rabin, who has discussed several of her own clients' cases and applied
public choice insights to account for the behavior of ICE and USCIS decisionmakers in those
cases and others. Rabin, supra note 11, at 1; Nina Rabin, Searching for Humanitarian
Discretion in Immigration Enforcement: Reflections on a Year as an ImmigrationAttorney

in the Trump Era, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 139 (2019). Others emphasizing the importance
of bureaucratic culture are Cu6llar, supra note 11; Kagan, supra note 11; and Schlanger,
supra note 28.
52. See Anil Kalhan, DeferredAction, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule
of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration,63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 66-68 (2015).
53. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 670. See generally Jill E. Family, Administrative Law
Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2012) (discussing
immigration law as a type of administrative law).
54. See generally TICHENOR, supra note 36 (describing the passage of major
immigration reform measures in American history).
55. See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, ImmigrationExceptionalism,
111 Nw. U. L. REV. 583, 584-85 (2017) ("Immigration law is famously exceptional. The
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When the immigration enforcement bureaucracy makes law, it tends
to do so informally. 56 Its law very rarely emerges from notice-andcomment rulemaking. 57 To some extent, that law is shaped by the
adjudicatory decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney

General, and the federal courts. The Attorney General, in particular, has
recently exercised an unprecedented degree of influence on immigration
adjudication by issuing a series of decisions changing immigration law
doctrines and procedures. 58 But these decisions, by limiting immigrants'
procedural rights and access to immigration courts, have only heightened
the importance of the discretion exercised by bureaucrats at ICE, CBP,

and USCIS.59
The immigration bureaucracy might at first seem an unlikely
breeding ground for zealous administration. It has long been the black
sheep of the American administrative state. Without a true and lasting
home, it has roved from agency to agency, conflictual in its approach to
its subject matter, and embattled by the public perception that it has not
done a particularly good job. 60 Part of this is a function of its mission,
which requires it to perform two seemingly conflicting tasks: letting
immigrants in and kicking them out.
In a sense, the two are related: vetting new immigrants requires

assessing the risks of admitting them; and enforcing the grounds of
deportability against resident non-citizens requires the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to not deport persons who, despite having
committed a technical violation, are a low risk. On the whole, though, the
tasks have manifested very different modes of operation in the United
States: one, resembling the work of traditional bureaucracies organized

Supreme Court's jurisprudence is littered with special immigration doctrines that depart
from mainstream constitutional norms."); infra Part I.C.

56. See Family, supra note 53, at 587.
57. Id. at 588.
58. See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (Att'y Gen. July 29, 2019) (reversing
Board precedent concerning family as a cognizable social group in an asylum case); Matter
of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (Att'y Gen. Apr. 16, 2019) (overturning Board precedent
concerning bond for certain asylum seekers); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (Att'y
Gen. Aug. 16, 2018) (modifying the standard for obtaining a continuance in an immigration
court case); Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (Att'y Gen. June 11, 2018) (reversing Board
precedent concerning domestic violence-based asylum cases); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27

I&N Dec. 271 (Att'y Gen. May 17, 2018) (modifying the standard for administratively
closing an immigration court case).
59. See Cular, supra note 11, at 13 ("Routines and administrative practices ... play
a critical role in shaping how immigration law is experienced and what consequences it
creates.").

60.

See id. at 59-75.
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around the adjudication of government benefits; the other, looking more
like police or military work. 61
These strikingly different modes of operation have attracted to the
bureaucracy both officials with a pro-immigrant worldview and those

62
with a law-and-order, sometimes even xenophobic, mentality. How the

law enforcement mission and culture have come to dominate over the
service culture and mission is important for understanding that
bureaucracy's recent behavior.
A.

The Scattered and PeripateticImmigration Bureaucracy
Immigration policy raises difficult economic, philosophical, and legal

questions.63 It is perhaps unsurprising that the United States has
struggled with how to define and situate the immigration bureaucracy in
relation to the other functions of government. Is immigration primarily

an economic, foreign relations, humanitarian, law enforcement, or
64
national security issue? How one answers this question impacts where

the agency is located.
Currently, USCIS, ICE, and CBP all exist within the DHS, but four
other cabinet level agencies are also involved in aspects of immigration
regulation. 65 The Department of Justice contains the immigration courts
66
and Board of Immigration Appeals; the Department of Labor weighs in
67
on employment-based immigration; the State Department adjudicates

foreign visa applications; 68 and the Department of Health and Human
Services handles aspects of refugee resettlement and housing for

61. See generally CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21899, BORDER
SECURITY: KEY AGENCIES AND THEIR MISSIONS 2 (2010).

62. See infra Section I.C.
63. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of
Emigration and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 235 (2006) ("Assuming that
emigration and immigration states both implement policies aimed at maximizing their
domestic [social] welfare.. .. "). See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:
THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); ARISTIDE

R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN (2006); Michael Walzer, The Distributionof Membership,
in PETER BROWN & HENRY SHUE, BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS

(1981).
64. Cular, supra note 11, at 26 (describing immigration as "a regulatory domain
simultaneously shaping labor markets, perceptions of security, and the scope of the national
community" and affecting "a vast array of economic, political, and social interests").
65.

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 11 (2012),

2
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%2Genealogy/Our% OHis
tory/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY].
66. See id. at 7.
67. See id. at 10.
68. See HADDAL, supra note 61, at 5.
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unaccompanied immigrant children. 69 This fragmented arrangement is
perhaps a vestige of the agency's transient legacy. In the past, the
immigration service was at one time or another primarily housed in the

Departments

of Treasury,

Labor,

and

Justice. 70

The

changing

categorization of immigration likely reflects the nation's shifting views

over time about its costs and benefits.
1.

The Department of Treasury

The federal government did not become heavily involved in
immigration regulation until the late nineteenth century. 71 When it did
so, it was for the purpose of enforcing a policy of racial exclusion, fixing

its trajectory over the following century and a half as an enforcementoriented bureaucracy. 72 After passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, "U.S. Customs Collectors at each port of entry began collecting [the]
'head tax' from immigrants, while 'Chinese Inspectors"' excluded Chinese

nationals. 73 Over the following decades, the federal government's role
continued to expand. 74 "[T]he 1891 Immigration Act created the Office of
the Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury Department." 76
The Superintendent oversaw a new corps of Immigrant Inspectors, many
of whom were former Customs Inspectors and "Chinese Inspectors." 76 In
1895, Congress retitled the "Office of Immigration" as the "Bureau of
Immigration" and made its head the "Commissioner-General of
Immigration." 77
2.

The Department of Labor

In 1903, the Bureau of Immigration was transferred from the
Treasury Department to the newly-created Department of Commerce
and Labor-a recognition that immigrants were not just a source of
revenue; they overwhelmingly were laborers. 78 In 1906, Congress passed
the Basic Naturalization Act, which also created the Federal

69. See generally Jennifer M. Chacon, PrivatizedImmigration Enforcement, 52 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (2017).
70.

See OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 1-2.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
See generally id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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79
Naturalization Service to oversee the nation's naturalization courts.
Congress combined this new agency with the Bureau of Immigration,
80
which it renamed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. In

1913, the Department of Commerce and Labor was divided into separate
cabinet departments. 81 Afterward,

the Bureau of Immigration and

Naturalization split again into the Bureau of Immigration and the
Bureau of Naturalization, both housed within the new Department of
Labor. 82
3.

The Department of Justice

The Bureaus of Immigration and Naturalization were reunited
within the Department of Labor as the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) in 1933.83 The war years saw the INS increasingly involved
in law enforcement and national security work, and in 1940 President

Roosevelt moved the INS from the Department of Labor to the
84

Department of Justice.
The next major bureaucratic reshuffling occurred in 1983, when
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals were moved

out of the INS into an independent new sub-agency of the Department of
Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).85 The move
addressed criticism that the immigration judges were biased because

they worked for the same agency that prosecuted deportation and
exclusion cases. 86
4.

The Department of Homeland Security

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress mobilized
around a plan to improve counter-terrorism through administrative

79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8. Secretary Perkins later expressed disappointment with the move, saying
that immigration "deals with human affairs and, I should say, is more properly located in
the Federal Security Agency [a predecessor of the Department of Health and Human
Services] or the Department of the Interior. It should not be a permanent function of the
Department of Labor or the Department of Justice and certainly not of the FBI." FRANcIS
PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 361 (1946).
85.

OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 7.

86.

See Cu6llar, supra note 11, at 48.
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restructuring. 87 The Homeland Security Act created DHS-an
administrative behemoth that "melded the functions of twenty-two
previously existing agencies, from Treasury's Customs Service, to
Agriculture's Plum Island Animal Disease Center, to the previously
independent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)."88 The
new agency had "to encompass functions ranging from international child
labor investigations to marine fuel leaks." 89 Congress's goal in creating
such a heterogeneous and far-flung agency was to unite "under a single
department those elements within the government whose primary

responsibility is to secure the United States homeland." 90 The statutory
mandate of DHS was "to prevent terrorist attacks." 91
The HSA abolished the former INS and placed its functions under
three new sub-agencies of DHS: USCIS, CBP, and ICE.92 It left EOIR
untouched within the Department of Justice, and it did not alter the role
that the State Department played in adjudicating foreign visa
applications, 93 the Department of Labor in employer-based visa
petitions, 9 4 or the Department of Health and Human Services in refugee
resettlement. 95 Thus, the immigration bureaucracy became more
scattered, even as it grew and was tasked with a major new focus on
national security.
The mission of CBP was to "prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the country, provide security at U.S. borders and ports of
entry, apprehend illegal immigrants, stem the flow of illegal drugs, and
protect American agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
and diseases." 96 It "absorb[ed] employees from the [INS], the Border
Patrol, the Customs Service, and the Department of Agriculture." 97
ICE's mission was to enforce "criminal and civil laws governing
border control, customs, trade, and immigration." 9 8 It inherited the INS's
enforcement apparatus as well as functions of the former United States

87. See Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy:Homeland Security and the Political
Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REv. 673, 684-85 (2006).
88. Id. at 676.
89. Id. at 696.
90. H.R. REP. No. 107-609, pt. 1, at 63 (2002).
91. 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A) (2019).
92. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002).
93. See HADDAL, supra note 61, at 5.
94. See OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65.
95. See generally Chac6n, supra note 69.
96. HADDAL, supra note 61.
97. Id.
98.

OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65.
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Customs Service. 99 Initially, ICE was imagined as the investigative arm

of DHS.100 Its Office of Investigations had oversight over a variety of
programs, including the Air and Marine Operations Branch, the Federal
Protective Service, the Federal Air Marshals, and Deportation and
Removal Operations (DRO).10 Over time, it evolved into just two subagencies: Enforcement and Removal Operations (formerly DRO), and
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), dedicated to investigating
102
transnational crime and terrorism.
USCIS was charged with overseeing "lawful immigration to the
United States and naturalization of new American citizens."103 Although
the Department of State adjudicates applications for most temporary
"nonimmigrant" visas, USCIS handles the majority of immigration
applications, including naturalization applications, applications to

immigrate based on a relationship to a United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident family member or a U.S.-based employer,
applications for asylum and other humanitarian benefits, employment

authorization applications, and applications to change status from one
104
It processes these petitions and
type of temporary visa to another.

applications in four major USCIS Service Centers and eighty-three Field

10 5
Almost all of its
Offices in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
work involves the provision of immigration services rather than
enforcement, with the one exception being the Office of Fraud Detection

and National Security, which seeks to root out fraud and address
criminal and national
106
applications.
B.

security

issues

raised

by

immigration

The BipolarImmigration Bureaucracy

The United States has long been of two minds about immigration. On
one hand, it has welcomed and tried to "Americanize" or assimilate new

99. See Letter from Homeland Sec. Investigations, Special Agents in Charge, to
Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. 1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103.
104.

OvERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65.
See A Day in the Life of USCIS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERvS., https://

www.uscis.gov/about-us/a-day-life-uscis (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
105. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44038, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS) FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING 2 (2015).

106.

Id. at 2-4.
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arrivals. 107 On the other, it has pursued tough immigration restrictions
to limit the number and type of immigrants.108 The two philosophies of
assimilation and restriction naturally entail very different modes of
bureaucratic action.1 09 An assimilationist policy would seem to involve a

bureaucracy that looks like other offices that primarily allocate
government benefits, like the Social Security Administration. On the
other hand, an office that is bent on restricting the number of immigrants
would seem to look more like a law enforcement or military agency,
patrolling the border and interior of the country for unauthorized
migrants.

These distinct modes of bureaucratic action can be traced to the early
days of immigration policy. In the early twentieth century, Congress
codified visa requirements and implemented immigration quotas,
requiring an agency able to engage in complex adjudication.1O At the
same time, the country was shifting from a relatively open border to a
policed one. 1"' By the end of the 1920s, the Bureaus of Immigration and
Naturalization engaged in two discrete functions: immigration services
and enforcement, with the latter looking much like criminal
enforcement.11 2 As the Great Depression took hold, the agency came to
increasingly prioritize enforcement. 11 ' This was a function of the
restrictionist character of the laws passed by Congress in the 1920s, a
decline in net migration into the United States, and the protectionist
politics of the Depression."4 Along with a massive campaign of Mexican
repatriation largely carried out by local authorities,11 5 the federal
government substantially increased deportations, which were viewed by
the Hoover administration's Labor Secretary William Doak as a means
to protect jobs for United States citizens.116

107. James R. Barrett, Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the
Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880-1930, 79 J. AM. HIsT. 996, 997
(1992).
108. Cornelius D. Scully, Reorganizing the Administration of the Immigration Laws:
Recommendations and Historical Context, 75 No. 26 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937, 940
(1998).

109.
110.

See generally id. at 941.
Id. at 940.

111. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 21-47 (2004).

112.
113.

114.

See OvERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 7.
See NGAI, supra note 111, at 108-10.
Id.

115.
FRANCISCo E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S 151 (2006).
116.
See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 215 (2010).
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The INS during the Great Depression raided immigrant
communities, arrested suspected unauthorized migrants without

procuring warrants, and offered little due process to those in deportation
proceedings. 117

Administrative

reformers

critiqued

the

arbitrary

118
deportation procedures and argued for judicial review. These measures
gained some traction during the Roosevelt administration, when the
agency adopted fairer procedures and methods for granting discretionary
relief from removal. 119

Although Roosevelt's progressive administrators endeavored to bring

due process and discretion to deportation proceedings, after the outbreak
of World War II, the INS increasingly undertook national security tasks
like fingerprinting every non-citizen in the country through the new
Alien Registration Program, operating internment camps for "enemy
120
It also ran an
aliens," and increasing its border patrol operations.

exploitative guest worker initiative called the Bracero program, which

compensated for the War's labor shortage by importing an average of
121
200,000 bracerosfrom Mexico each year.

The post-war period also saw a militaristic new deportation
122
It used harsh
campaign, shamefully named "Operation Wetback."
tactics to apprehend and summarily deport 170,000 undocumented

123
immigrants in its first three months of operation. The national security

initiatives of World War II-including Japanese internment and alien

registration, the move of the agency to the
massive post-war deportation campaign of
Cold War focus on deporting persons with
lent the INS a decidedly enforcement focus,

Department of Justice, the
Operation Wetback, and a
communist affiliations-all
and a rather draconian one

at that.
This focus shifted a bit after passage of the Immigration Act of 1965,
which abolished the blatantly discriminatory national origin quotas and

24
replaced them with a more facially egalitarian system.1 As a result, in

117. NGAI, supra note 111, at 72-74.
118. JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE
(1931). See generally WILLIAM C. VAN VLECK, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS: A
STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1932); NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENF'T, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 34-35 (1931).
NGAI, supra note 111, at 82-84.
119.
OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 8.
120.
NGAI, supra note 111, at 128.
121.
122. Id. at 155-56.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 26.
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the late 1960s, the culture of the INS shifted a bit, and adjudication grew
in importance relative to enforcement.125
Yet over the course of the following decades, the INS's emphasis
"steadily shifted back toward enforcement." 126 Enforcement received "the
lion's share of the budget and attention" and there was "a perception that
enforcement personnel, including Border Patrol officers ... stood a better
chance of reaching senior positions-such as District Director, for

example-than those who work[ed] as adjudicators." 127 As enforcement
occupied much of the INS's energies, adjudication backlogs grew. 128 At
the same time, courts struck down enforcement efforts that violated
constitutional norms, leading the INS to focus more on preventing
unauthorized entries and combatting fraud, false documents, and
smuggling than on apprehending undocumented immigrants already in

the United States. 129 The adjudication backlogs and the INS's failure to
fully address undocumented immigration led those on all sides of the
political spectrum to believe the INS to be dysfunctional. 130
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act

(IRCA).131

IRCA added significant

new enforcement

and service

responsibilities for the INS.132 On the one hand, the agency was charged
with a massive legalization project that ultimately led to 2.7 million
undocumented persons obtaining status in the United States. 133 In terms
of enforcement, the agency for the first time became responsible for
bringing sanctions against employers who hired unauthorized
workers. 134 Although the agency initially pursued both initiatives, its

employer sanctions efforts ultimately were seen to lack real teeth. 135 For

125.
126.

Scully, supra note 108, at 941.

Id.

127. Id. "In 1980, an OMB budget examiner told a study team of the House Government
Operations Committee that 'some of the INS's problems in handling resources result from

a long-standing conflict between enforcement and service responsibilities,' and complained
that 'the agency put too much emphasis on enforcement and too little on service."' COLO.
STATE ADVISORY COMM., CITIZENSHIP DELAYED: CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG IN CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 37

n.275 (2019) (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2018)).
128. Scully, supra note 108, at 942.
129. See id. at 940-41.
130. See generally id.
131. OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 10.
132. See id.
133.

NANCY

RYTINA, OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, STATISTICS Div., U.S.
AND NATURALIZATION SERV., IRCA LEGALIZATION EFFECTS: LAWFUL
PERMANENT RESIDENCE AND NATURALIZATION THROUGH 2001 3 (2002).
134. OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 10.
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135. Huyen Pham, The PrivateEnforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 803
(2008).
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a time, the agency seemed again to be tilting a bit away from enforcement
and toward service. Its immigration services also received a budgetary
boost in 1990 when Congress created the "Immigration Examinations

Fee Account" (IEFA) to hold immigration application fees. 136 The account
became a substantial source in the following years for funding the
agency's operations. 137
This shift toward services continued with the creation in 1990 of a

new Asylum Corps. 138 That year, the government issued additional
139
The regulations took
regulations implementing the 1980 Refugee Act.
responsibility for asylum cases away from the INS District Offices, which
had been criticized for overwhelmingly denying asylum to thousands of

Central American refugees in the 1980s who had real reason to fear

140
Instead, asylum claims
persecution in their war-torn home countries.

would be handled by a professional cadre of officers trained in human
1
rights law. 14
That same year, Congress appointed yet another commission to study
immigration policy. 142 The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
released its final report in 1997, and recommended a major structural
overhaul of immigration.14 3 It concluded that the INS cannot be both a
benefits agency and an enforcement agency, and perform both functions

effectively. 144 Therefore, it recommended that the INS's enforcement
functions should be left in the Department of Justice, but that its benefits
145
functions should be transferred to the Department of State. Legislative
efforts in the wake of the report to restructure the agency to separate out
the INS's enforcement
146
unsuccessful.

and

immigration

services

functions

were

136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m) (2018).
137. See id. The Immigration Examinations Fee Account was established by Act of Oct.
1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 1988; it was amended the following fiscal year to fund all
immigration adjudication activities by the FY 1990 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1989.
138. See Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (July
27, 1990) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, and 253).
139. Id. at 30674-75.
See id. at 30674-76. See generally JAMES SILK, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT:
140.
DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (Virginia Hamilton ed., 1986).

141.
142.

Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. at 30674-76.
See OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 10.

See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
143.
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 1 (1997).

144.
145.

See id. at 177-78.
Id.

146.

See OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, supra note 65, at 10.
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At the end of the twentieth century, the INS workforce, which

numbered approximately 8,000 from World War II through the late
1970s, had increased to more than 30,000 employees in thirty-six INS
districts at home and abroad. 147 It was widely viewed as ineffectual,
hampered by a fundamental incompatibility between its competing

missions of enforcement and immigration services. 148 Commentators
with intimate knowledge of the agency felt that enforcement
predominated over service, and suggested that the agency's history and
its position within the enforcement-oriented DOJ were the causes of this
imbalance. 149
The internal conflict between enforcement and service was
ultimately resolved by the HSA's bifurcation of the INS.150 By giving ICE
responsibility for enforcement and USCIS responsibility for benefits

adjudication, the HSA adopted the recommendation of the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform to separate the two functions. 151
However, the Commission had recommended that the benefits
adjudication agency be placed in the State Department, which at least in
part shared a service-oriented mission.152 In contrast, the HSA placed

USCIS within an agency dedicated to national security-a mission in
tension with immigration services. 153

C. The Zealous ImmigrationBureaucracy
During the debates in the late 1990s over whether to divide the INS

into separate enforcement and benefits agencies, some had argued that
the two functions were interconnected and that dividing them could lead
to insufficient scrutiny of benefit applications or enforcement devoid of

compassion. 154 There appears to have been something to this critique
because, in the years since their creation, ICE has increasingly engaged
in hyper-regulation. Efforts during the Obama administration to rein in

ICE largely failed, and since President Trump took office on a pledge to
ramp up immigration enforcement, ICE has been empowered to zealously

147. Id.
148. See Scully, supra note 108, at 941-42.
149. See Papademetriou et al., supra note 31; Scully, supranote 108, at 939-43.
150. Letter from Nineteen HSI Special Agents in Charge to The Hon. Kirstjen Nielsen,
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 1, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4562896FILE-3286.html [hereinafter Letter from Nineteen HSI Special Agents].
151. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 143, at 177-78.
152. See id.
153. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 87.
154. House Holds Hearing on INS RestructuringProposals, Legislation Introduced, 75
No. 21 INTERPRETER RELEASES 774, 775 (1998).
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155
Parts of USCIS have resisted
and single-mindedly pursue this mission.

hyper-regulation, while other elements of USCIS have been cooptedpushed toward embracing it. The degree of zeal that USCIS and ICE have
manifested for immigration enforcement is related to each agency's
culture as well as budgetary and other institutional incentives.

1.

ICE

Freed of oversight by INS managers who sometimes were less zealous
156
During the
about enforcement, ICE initially showed little restraint.
Bush administration, ICE engaged in a series of high-profile workplace

raids, such as a raid in Postville, Iowa, that led to assembly-line
prosecutions and removal proceedings against hundreds of Latino
157
It administered a "Special
workers at an Iowa meat packing plant.
Registration" program that required males over the age of sixteen from
certain predominately Muslim countries to register, which led to the

deportation of thousands of Muslim males. 158 The agency ramped up
immigration detention and began outsourcing detention management to
private prison companies that were not accountable to detainees for
159
violations of detention standards.

These private prison contractors were a powerful ally to ICE in
congressional budget negotiations. 160 Flush with government contracts,

161
In
private companies like Geo Group and CoreCivic lobbied Congress.
2004, the detention contractor, GEO Group, spent $120,000 on federal
163
The
lobbying. 16 2 Over time, that amount has steadily increased.
lobbying arm of GEO Group spent $1.54 million on lobbying in 2018,
164
deploying only lobbyists who previously worked in government.

Another detention contractor, CoreCivic, followed closely behind in its

155. See Katelyn Gamba, How New Jersey's Bail Reform and President Trump's
Immigration Policies May Affect Undocumented Immigrants, 46 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 16
(2018).
156. See Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville:A Legal
Perspective, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 31, 32 (2008).
157.
158.

See id.
See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
159. See Denise Gilman & Luis A. Romero, Immigration Detention, Inc., 6 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 145, 149-53 (2018).
160. See id. at 148.
161. Id. at 152.
162. Client Profile: GEO Group, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/federallobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2004&id=D000022003 (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
163. See Gilman & Romero, supra note 159, at 149.
Client Profile: GEO Group, supranote 162.
164.
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lobbying expenditures, paying $1.23 million in 2018, and also giving
$378,000 in contributions. 165

The Obama administration attempted to impose a set of enforcement
priorities on ICE.166 On June 17, 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued
two significant memoranda on the use of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration matters. 167 These memoranda described a set of priorities
for immigration enforcement, and a set of criteria for agents to consider
in assessing whether to pursue removal proceedings. 168 The agency's
lawyers were ordered to undertake a sweeping self-examination of ICE's
removal docket, with a goal of administratively closing cases that fell
outside agency priorities.169 Lawyers could cite to the Morton memo in
support of requests that the agency exercise its prosecutorial discretion

to not pursue removal proceedings against their clients. The agency could
even dole out a quasi-benefit in these cases called "deferred action,"
which came, not only with a reprieve from removal, but also a work
permit. 170
These initiatives did not square with ICE's enforcement-oriented
culture, and immigrants' lawyers struggled to convince ICE officials to
favorably exercise prosecutorial discretion in even the most sympathetic

cases. 171 The ICE union, which represented 7,000 ICE officers, blocked
efforts by the DHS to train its members on how to prioritize deportation
cases and exercise discretion under the memos. 172 ICE's review of
approximately 300,000 pending removal cases resulted in less than 2%

165. Camille Erickson, Detention Center Contractors Will Keep Reaping ProfitEven After
DHS Upheaval, OPENSEcRETS.ORG (Apr. 15, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2019/04/detention-center-contractors-keep-reaping-profit-after-dhs-upheaval/.
166. Lazaro Zamora, Comparing Trump and Obama's Deportation Priorities,
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/comparingtrump-and-obamas-deportation-priorities/.
167. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't, to
Agency Pers., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion];
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't, to Agency
Pers., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011)
[hereinafter Morton, Certain Victims].
168. Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 167, at 1; Morton, Certain
Victims, supra note 167, at 1.
169. Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 167, at 3-5; Morton,
Certain Victims, supra note 167, at 2.
170. Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 167, at 3.
171. See Rabin, supra note 11, at 204-08.
172. Julia Preston, Agents' Union Stalls Trainingon DeportationRules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimesfocus-of-deportation.html.
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of them being closed. 173 Practicing immigration attorneys reported that

"in practice the memos did almost nothing to change enforcement
174
practices on the ground."

Faced with recalcitrance from ICE, on June 15, 2012, the President
175
President
tried another tactic to impose prosecutorial priorities.
Obama announced creation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

(DACA) program to offer categorical deferred action to undocumented
176
Over the following
youth who could meet certain requirements.
months, USCIS hired hundreds of new workers to implement the new
initiative, which was expected to result in a large increase in application

fees for USCIS.177
The program had the look of an end-run around ICE,178 and, in

August 2012, a group of ICE agents and the State of Mississippi sued to
try to stop implementation of DACA.179 The lawsuit failed, and, in
November 2014, the Obama administration took an even greater leap to
180
increase the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to limit deportations.
First, then DHS Secretary, Jeh Johnson, issued a new prosecutorial
181
Under the memo, ICE
discretion memo to replace the earlier memos.
had three priorities for removal, and undocumented immigrants without

criminal convictions who had not recently entered the United States were
not a priority for removal. 182 Second, President Obama moved to create a
new categorical deferred action program for USCIS to administer173. Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Restore the Promise of Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Assessment of DHS' Prosecutorial Discretion Initiative and its Impact on
Families on the Anniversary of its Announcement 3 (June 2012), https://
fairimmigration.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/restore-the-promise-full-report.pdf.
174. Ahilan Arulanathan, The President'sRelief Programas a Response to Insurrection,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014), https:/Ibalkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/the-presidents-reliefprogram-as.html.
175. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 680.
176. Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of
Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DIScOURSE 58, 61 (2015).
177. See Daniel Hanlon, USCIS Ramps up Hiring for DACA Processing, ASIAN J. (Aug.
28, 2012), http://asianjournal.com/immigration/uscis-ramps-up-hiring-for-daca-processing/
(noting a DACA application fee of $465.00 as well as approximately 1.5 million potentiallyqualified applicants).
178. See Kagan, supranote 11, at 666 ("President Obama has been frustrated in his push
for comprehensive immigration reform through legislation and thus has used unilateral
executive action as an alternative to achieve his policy goals.").
179. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
180. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 683-84.
181. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enft, et al. 1-4 (Nov.
20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memoprosecutoria
1_discretion.pdf.
182. See id.
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Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA), which would have
granted deferred action to millions of parents of United States citizens. 183
Texas and twenty-five other states or governors of states successfully
sued to enjoin DAPA.184 The point became moot, in any event, with the
election of President Trump, who pursued a maximalist approach to
immigration enforcement. In his first month in office, President Trump
issued three executive orders concerning immigration.1 85 The most
prominent of these was his so-called "Muslim Ban," which initially halted

refugee

processing

and

banned

travel

by

nationals

of seven

predominately Muslim countries to the United States.186 His order on

interior enforcement, however, has arguably had a more sweeping
impact.

It

reversed

the

Obama

administration's

priorities

for

enforcement, stating explicitly that all persons in the country without
status were now considered enforcement priorities. 187
In sharp contrast to its resistance to the Obama prosecutorial
discretion directives, ICE quickly embraced the Trump administration
approach. 188 In February 2017, an internal ICE memorandum to its

employees stated, "effective immediately, ERO [(Enforcement and
Removal Operations)] officers will take enforcement action against all
removable [immigrants] encountered in the course of their duties." 189
Since this memorandum, mid-level and lower-level ICE officers have
pursued immigration enforcement with a fanaticism unseen in recent
memory. 190 In February 2017, a DACA recipient was deported. 191 That

183. Kagan, supra note 11, at 666, 684.
184. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff'd, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
185.

SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF

TRUMP 7 (2019).
186. Id. at 8-9.
187. Id. at 30-32.
188. See generally id. (examining the changes in immigration enforcement policies,
procedures, and actual practices undertaken in the beginning of the Trump
administration).
189. Marcelo Rochabrun, ICE Officers Told to Take Action Against All Undocumented
Immigrants Encountered While on Duty, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 2017), https://
www.propublica.org/article/ice-officers-told-to-take-action-against-all-undocumented-immi
grants-encountered-while-on-duty (citing Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec.
Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, to All ERO Emps. 1 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/3889695-doc00801320170630123624.html).
190. See e.g., WADHIA, supra note 185, at 45-48 ("ICE has publicized immigration raids
on their website by issuing press releases . . . . In June 2018, ICE arrested more than one
hundred workers in two locations of Corso's Flower and Garden Center based in Ohio.").
191. Alan Gomez & David Agren, First ProtectedDREAMer Is Deported Under Trump,
USA TODAY (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/18/firstprotected-dreamer-deported-under-trump/100583274/.
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summer, a veteran ICE officer gave an interview, stating, "The problem
is that now there are lots of people [at the agency] who feel free to feel
contempt," and "[in the past] I'd never have someone say, 'Why do I have
to call an interpreter? Why don't they speak English?' Now I get it

frequently." 192
In short order, ICE virtually ceased exercising

prosecutorial

193

From February through June of 2016, the Obama
discretion.
administration had closed an average of approximately 2,400

immigration court cases per month in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion. 194 During the same period in 2017, fewer than 100 cases were

closed per month, amounting to a 96% drop in the use of prosecutorial
95
discretion in immigration removal proceedings.1

ICE

showed

no qualms

about

making

collateral

arrests of

undocumented immigrants "in immigration raids targeting their friends,

neighbors and coworkers."1 96 In July 2017, ICE arrested 650 people in a
four-day operation, of which 457 were not original targets of the raid,

meaning that "a full 70% of the immigrants swept up in this operation
197
were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time."

Over the summer of 2017, the agency began using the children of
undocumented parents as "bait" to arrest their sponsors in cases where
it contended that the parents had helped their undocumented children
come to the United States. 198 ICE officers began staking out traffic court
and other state courts, and arresting undocumented immigrants who

showed up for their cases.1 99 In January 2018, ICE agents arrested two

192.

Jonathan Blitzer, A Veteran ICE Agent, Disillusionedwith the Trump Era, Speaks

Out, NEW YORKER (July 24, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-veteran-

ice-agent-disillusioned-with-the-trump-era-speaks-out.
193. Immigration Court Dispositions Drop 9.3 Percent Under Trump, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (July 17, 2017), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/474/.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Tessa Berenson, Immigration Raids Are Sweeping Up More People Who Weren't
Targets, TIME (Aug. 9, 2017), https://time.com/4893074/immigration-raids-undocumentedtargets/.
197. Id.
198. John Burnett, ICE HasArrested More than 400 in OperationTargetingParents Who
2 32
Pay Smugglers, NPR (Aug. 18, 2017, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/5445 31/
arrests-of-undocumented-parents-sparks-debate-between-federal-officials-and-immi; Ryan
Devereaux, Documents Detail ICE Campaign to Prosecute Migrant Parents as Smugglers,
INTERcEPT (Apr. 29, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/04/29/ice-documentsprosecute-migrant-parents-smugglers/.
199. There was a 900% surge in New York court arrests from 2016-17. Stephen Rex
Brown, Courthouse Arrests of Immigrants by ICE Agents Have Risen 900% in New York
This Year: Immigrant Defense Project, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://
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Indonesian nationals as they dropped their children off for school in New
Jersey, 200 and detained and moved to deport an outspoken immigrant
activist, allegedly in retaliation for his constitutionally-protected
speech. 201 In August 2018, ICE officers arrested a man driving his
pregnant wife to the hospital for her Cesarean section.20 2
Just as the enforcement focus of the former INS consistently
prevailed over its adjudicatory responsibilities, these aggressive
enforcement tactics by ICE ERO overwhelmed the investigative
functions of ICE HSI.203 Over time, ERO siphoned the HSI budget to pay
to house its growing population of immigrant detainees.2 04 As ICE's

enforcement efforts garnered publicity, the agency became synonymous
with immigration enforcement, even though half of the agency was
supposed to be dedicated to tasks like protecting immigrant trafficking
victims.2 05 Some local law enforcement authorities decided over time to
limit their cooperation with ICE's immigration enforcement.2 06 However,
HSI relies on cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies
for its work, and ICE's reputation in some jurisdictions made its work

difficult.20 7 These issues led a group of nineteen HSI Special Agents in
Charge to write a letter to DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen in June 2018
requesting that HSI be separated from ICE and made its own agency.208
Enforcement prevailed over service at the former INS, but after the

INS was dissolved, ICE became even more zealous about deportation
than the INS had been.2 09 The agency was populated by mission zealots
who pursued "indiscriminate deportation" policies that were intended to

have a general deterrent effect on undocumented immigration, rather

www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ice-courthouse-arrests-immigrants-900-n-y-2017-article-

1.3633463.
200. Ted Sherman, AG Criticizes ICE Arrests of Immigrants as Kids Were Going to
School, NJ.coM (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nj.com/news/2018/01/ag-criticizesicearrests
of immigrants-as-kids-we.html.

201. Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 59-61 (2d Cir. 2019).
202. ICE Detains Man Driving Wife to Hospital to Deliver Baby, BBC (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45251249.
203. See, e.g., Letter from Nineteen HSI Special Agents, supranote 150.
204. See id. at 3-4. The letter noted that the following amounts were "reprogrammed"
from HSI to support ERO detention priorities: $5M in FY11, $10M in FY13, and $34.5M in
FY16. Id.
205. See id. at 1-4.
206. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 12, at 1236-37.
207. Letter from Nineteen HSI Special Agents, supra note 150, at 3.
208. Jason Buch, ICE Criminal Investigators Ask to Be Distanced from Detentions,
Deportations in Letter to Kirstjen Nielsen, TEX. OBSERVER (June 27, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://
www.texasobserver.org/ice-hsi-letter-kirstjen-nielsen-criminal-civil-deportation-zerotolerance/.

209.

See Frost, Alienating Citizens, supra note 22, at 61-62.
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than focusing on traditional priorities for removal, like non-citizens with
210
criminal convictions or serious immigration law violations. During the

Obama administration, mid-level and lower-level ICE officers effectively

resisted policies intended to redirect their efforts around traditional
removal priorities.

2 11

After the Trump administration eliminated the

Obama enforcement priorities, ICE's deportation zealots were enabled to
pursue their vision of indiscriminate deportation as a general deterrent
212
to unauthorized migration.

2.

USCIS

The new home of USCIS within DHS has impacted its operations.
Even without an intimate knowledge of Capitol Hill budget wrangling, it
is easy to imagine how a service-oriented agency stranded in a colossal
law enforcement- and national-security-oriented agency might wither.

The one advantage that USCIS had going into this new environment was
the IEFA that Congress had created as a partial funding source for the
INS.213 The IEFA was allocated in its entirety to USCIS, and over the
2 14
subsequent years, it became the agency's primary funding source. The
IEFA reduced USCIS's reliance on congressional appropriations and its
215
vulnerability to intra-agency budget battles.

Therefore, from a budgetary perspective, at least, USCIS has been
somewhat insulated from the pressures that might exist within DHS to
216
Its feeframe its operations and mission in terms of national security.

based funding has offered it some autonomy to continue to grant
immigration status to unauthorized migrants, and it has mostly
continued to do so, granting the majority of applications for many

immigration benefits, such as U visas for crime victims, T visas for
2 17
trafficking survivors, and DACA applications.

210.

See Rabin, supra note 11, at 199.

211.

See id.

See generally WADHIA, supra note 185.
213. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44038, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERvICES (USCIS) FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING 5 (2015).
212.

214.
215.
216.

Id.
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 3-4.

217.

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., 2018 USCIS STATISTIcAL ANNUAL

REPORT 2, 6-10 (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/statistics/2018_US
CIS_StatisticalAnnualReportFinal-_OPQ_5.28.19_EXA.pdf (granting more than eight
million benefit requests in 2018).
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Recently, however, DHS has moved to shift part of the IEFA to
ICE.218 Although the Immigration and Nationality Act mandates that the
funds

be

used

for

"providing

immigration

adjudication

and

naturalization services," 219 DHS has proposed to shift the IEFA funds
based on a dubious argument that "ICE investigations of potential
immigration fraud perpetrated by individuals and entities who have
sought immigration benefits before USCIS and efforts to enforce
applicable immigration law and regulations with regard to such
individuals and entities constitute direct support of immigration
adjudication and naturalization services."220
The siphoning of the IEFA is part of a general tilt toward
enforcement. In 2018, USCIS eliminated the phrase "nation of

immigrants" from its mission statement and ceased referring to
applicants and petitioners as "customers." 221 The shift is not merely
semantic; recent years have seen stricter rules, greater processing delays
due to increased scrutiny of applications, and more active collaboration
and information sharing with ICE.222

For example, in May 2017, USCIS proposed a new measure
subjecting foreign students and exchange visitors who inadvertently
commit even de minimis status violations to deportation proceedings. 223
In October 2017, USCIS rescinded its longstanding guidance that
directed personnel to give deference to prior determinations when
adjudicating nonimmigrant, employment-based extension petitions
involving the same position and the same employer. 22 4 These changes

have made it harder for USCIS officers to grant benefits. In June 2018,
USCIS made one of its biggest policy changes, issuing a new guidance

218. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain
Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 62280, 62287 (proposed
Nov. 14, 2019).
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1356(n) (2019).
220. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain
Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. at 62287.
221. Dara Lind, America's Immigration Agency Removes "Nationof Immigrants"from
Its Mission Statement, VOx (Feb. 22, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/22/
17041862/uscis-removes-nation-of-immigrants-from-missionstatement.
222. See id.
223. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM-602-1060, PoLICY MEMORANDUM:
ACCRUAL OF UNLAWFUL PRESENCE AND F, J, AND M NONIMMIGRANTS (2018), https://

www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/ Draft%20Memorandum%20for%2OCom
ment/AccrualofUnlawfulPresenceFJMNonimmigrantsMEMO_v2.pdf.
224. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS, PM-602-0151, POLICY MEMORANDUM:
RESCISSION OF GUIDANCE REGARDING DEFERENCE TO PRIOR DETERMINATIONS OF
ELIGIBILITY IN THE ADJUDICATION OF PETITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS

(2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-10-23
Rescission-of-Deference-PM6020151.pdf.
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allowing it to refer persons to removal proceedings upon denying
applications. 22 5 USCIS always referred some applicants for removal
226
proceedings, such as asylum, green card, or naturalization applicants.
However, a firewall previously existed between USCIS and ICE with

respect to humanitarian relief such as: T visas for trafficking survivors;
U visas for crime victims; Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) for
abused, abandoned, and neglected children; and self-petitions by abused
spouses and children of United States citizens and lawful permanent
residents under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).227 The referral
of such applicants for removal proceedings is a major change.
There is evidence of increasing information sharing between USCIS
and ICE. USCIS officers have begun turning over applicants for
immigration benefits to ICE at their interviews when the officer finds
that the person has a prior removal order, criminal conviction, or illegal

reentry.228 In July 2019, USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli "asked agency
personnel to volunteer to perform work for ICE at ICE field offices
229
throughout the country."
The new information sharing and collaboration between USCIS and
ICE contrasts with the agency's reduced transparency toward
immigrants. In October 2018, USCIS announced the phase-out of self-

scheduled "InfoPass" appointments, which allowed applicants and
attorneys to easily schedule in-person meetings with USCIS to discuss

POLICY
PM-602-0050.1,
SERvS.,
IMMIGRATION
AND
CITIZENSHIP
225. U.S.
MEMORANDUM: UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF
NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/LawsfMemoranda/2018/2018-06(2018),
28-PM-602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf.
226. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM- 602-0050, POLICY MEMORANDUM:
REVISED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE

OF

NOTICES TO APPEAR

(NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND REMOVABLE ALIENS (2011), https://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files[USCIS/LawsfMemoranda/StaticFilesMemoranda/NTA
%20PM%20%28Approved%20as%20final%2011-7-11 %29.pdf.
227. See generallyU.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS: HUMAN TRAFFICKING, CRIME VICTIMS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CHILD ABUSE (2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/T-

U-VAWA-relief.pdf.
228. Meagan Flynn, Citizenship Service Conspired with ICE to Trap'Immigrantsat Visa
Interviews, ACLU Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/15/citizenship-service-conspired-with-ice-to-trap-immigran
ts-at-green-card-interviews-aclu-says/.
229. See Letter from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus to the Honorable Ken
Cuccinelli, Acting Director, USCIS (July 31, 2019), https://congressionalhispaniccaucuscastro.house.gov/sites/congressionalhispaniccaucus.house.gov/files/7.31.19%2OCuccinelli%
20Letter.pdf.
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processing delays and other case problems. 230 In January 2019, USCIS
eliminated the "use of USCIS service center e-mail boxes for case-specific
questions." 23 1

The agency's greater scrutiny of applications has led to increased
delays. 232 "The overall average case processing time surged by 46[% from
FY 2016-18] and 91[%] since FY 2014."233 "USCIS processed 94[%]of its
form types-from green cards for family members to visas for human
trafficking victims to petitions for immigrant workers-more slowly in
FY 2018 than in FY 2014."234 Processing times for citizenship
applications approximately doubled from 2016 to 2019, from 5.6 months

to 10.1 months. 235 These increased processing times occurred even as case
volume appeared to markedly decrease: USCIS's "net backlog" exceeded
2.3 million delayed cases at the end of FY 2017-more than a 100%
increase over the span of one year-despite only a 4% rise in case receipts
during that period. 236

Despite USCIS's tilt to enforcement, it continues to have a different
culture than ICE, and this assures that there will be pockets of resistance
to ICE's cooption of the agency. Just as ICE officers resisted President

Obama's efforts to broaden the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
USCIS asylum officers have resisted some Trump Administration
policies. 237 The union representing USCIS asylum officers filed an amicus
brief in one case arguing that the Trump administration's "Migrant

Protection Protocol" (MPP), requiring asylum seekers to wait in Mexico
while their cases are adjudicated, is illegal and "contrary to America's
longstanding tradition of providing safe haven to people fleeing

230.

USCIS to Expand Information Services ModernizationProgram to Key Locations,

U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-

expand-information-services-modernization-program-key-locations (last updated Oct. 30,
2018).
231. Update on Case Assistance by Service Centers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/update-case-assistance-service-centers
(last
updated Dec. 21, 2018).
232. See generally AILA Policy Brief: USCIS Processing Delays Have Reached Crisis
Levels Under the Trump Administration,AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N. (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-policy-briefs/aila-policy-brief-uscis-processing-delays
[hereinafter AILA Policy Brief].
233. Id.
234. Id.
235.

COLO. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 116TH CONG.,

CITIZENSHIP DELAYED: CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG
IN CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 9 (Comm. Print 2019).

236. AILA Policy Brief, supra note 232.
237. Cf. Brief for Local 1924 as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees, Innovation
Law Lab, et al. v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-15716).
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persecution." 238 As USCIS's asylum officers have resisted Trump
administration immigration enforcement policies, the administration
has endeavored to circumvent them, by delegating some of the "credible
fear" interviews typically conducted by asylum officers to CBP agents
instead. 239
USCIS is one element of the scattered immigration bureaucracy,
which as a whole has been ideologically riven between assimilation and
restriction-structurally divided between service and enforcement. Over
time, its arc has been toward prioritizing enforcement over service-a

focus that has been dictated by agency structure, congressional grants of
vast discretion, and nativist politics-all of which have empowered
240
There have been periods when
deportation zealots within the agency.

the emphasis has shifted somewhat, such as the development of
discretionary relief from removal during the Roosevelt era, the period
following passage of the 1965 immigration act, the late 1980s through
early 1990s when the INS processed millions of amnesty applications and

developed an independent and professional asylum corps, and the Obama
241
administration's DACA program.

But the location of the INS within the Department of Justice and
USCIS within DHS has mostly assured that immigration services will be
subordinated to enforcement priorities. Deportation zealots have thrived
within this structure, finding themselves empowered during the Obama
years to resist the administration's enforcement priorities, and within
the Trump administration to pursue an indiscriminate deportation

policy. 242 USCIS, meanwhile, has been coopted, forced to bend its servicebased mission to enforcement needs, although its fee-based funding

structure and more heterogeneous culture allows it to maintain pockets
of resistance such as the Asylum Office.
II. A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

This Part introduces a comprehensive model of immigration
enforcement as regulation. In constructing our model, we draw on key
insights from public choice theory, which, in our view, best explains the

238. Id. at 4.
239. See Molly O'Toole, Border Patrol Will Screen Asylum Requests in New Push to
Restrict Claims, Memos Show, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://
2
01
www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-border-patrol-asylum-credible-fear-memos90509-story.html.
240. See supra Section II (discussing the interaction of these factors).
241. See supra Section I.B.
242. See supra Section I.C.1.
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behavior of the immigration enforcement bureaucracy. In narrowing our

theoretical lens, we sideline other approaches taken by legal scholars in
their descriptive and prescriptive accounts of agency behavior in the
immigration space and elsewhere. We do not argue that presidential
control has not been a strong contributor to hyper-regulation. Nor do we
suggest that technical expertise, 243 behavioral biases, 244 and deliberation
and dialogue among agencies and with the White House 245 have no role
to play in shaping immigration enforcement policy. But we do conclude
that agency mission, culture, budget, and institutional design are the
dominant drivers. 246 And these factors are the primary focus of
traditional public choice theory.
We begin by describing the key regulatory players in immigration

enforcement-the President, Congress, the Courts, the public,
immigration reform advocates, state, local, and foreign governments, the
immigrants themselves, and the agencies and their bureaucrats. Next,
we examine the power dynamics among them. In general, the pro-

regulatory forces are strong and anti-regulatory forces are weak.
Although each player exercises some degree of influence, the President
and the bureaucrats wield by far the most. When the President and the
bureaucrats clash, the bureaucrats often prevail within their own sphere
of influence. When the President and the bureaucrats join forces, such as
during the Trump
expands.

administration,

zealous

administration further

The conclusions of our model explain ICE's unmistakable trend,
irrespective of presidential imperatives, toward hyper-regulation: ICE's
enforcement
pattern
has
become
indiscriminate-treating
all
undocumented immigrants as equally worthy of deportation-and favors

pervasive

and

deportation"

performative

tactics

and deter prospective

intended
immigrants

to encourage

"self-

from entering the

country. 247 USCIS, for its part, has become coopted for ICE's enforcement
mission and enforcement patterns, although pockets of resistance to

243. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, EntrepreneurialAdministration, 97 B.U. L. REv. 2011,
2037 (2017).
244. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Hawkish Biases, in AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT INFLATION SINCE 9/11 79 (A. Trevor

Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009).
245. See generally, e.g., Landau, supra note 10 (noting the interplay between actors such
as agencies and the executive leadership).

246. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007) ("The academic literature on immigration law and
policy has largely neglected . .. institutional design.").
247. See ICE Focus Shifts Away from DetainingSerious Criminals,TRAC IMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/564/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
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hyper-regulation exist within USCIS, just as ICE resisted President

Obama's efforts to pursue a more restrained philosophy of immigration
enforcement. 248
Five major factors have contributed to the trend toward zealous
administration. They include: (1)

Congress's decision to house the

immigration enforcement arms in the DHS; (2) a resulting bureaucratic
culture at ICE, supported by its employees' union, that pushes it toward
hyper-regulation; (3) the pro-regulatory politics of crime and national
security; (4) the private contractors, who increasingly perform
enforcement functions, are driven by financial incentives, and use their
profits to lobby for pro-enforcement policies; and (5) the weakness of
immigration courts and limits on Article III judicial review, both of which
249
would otherwise serve as limits on hyper-regulation.

A. Public Choice Insights and Regulation
Public Choice Theory emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and inspired
250
Many of
much of the Reagan Administration's administrative reforms.
William
incentives.
bureaucrats'
on
focus
insights
its most enduring

Niskanen, in an influential 1971 study, hypothesized that bureaucrats
seek to maximize their own utility by increasing their agencies'
budgets. 251 Larger budgets begat increases in "salary, perquisites of the

office, public reputation, power, patronage, [and the] output of the
bureau." 252 Other theorists fleshed out Niskanen's sketch of the rational
bureaucrat. 253 Zeal for their agency's mission was believed to have special

248.
249.
250.
choice

See supra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.C.3
See Mashaw, supra note 47, at 2-8 (tracing the development of economic public
theory from its inception to present day).

251.

See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

39 (1971) ("It is impossible for any one bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of
the limits on his information and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his
personal motivations."); see also William A. Niskanen, Nonmarket Decision Making: The
PeculiarEconomics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 293, 293-94 (1968) (discussing how
bureaucrats maximize utility). The figure of the empire-building bureaucrat has had lasting
influence in the public imagination as well. See Benjamin H. Barton, Harry Potter and the
Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, 104 MIcH. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2006) (observing that popular
fantasy author J.K. Rowling, in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, "depict[s] a
Ministry of Magic run by self-interested bureaucrats bent on increasing and protecting
their power, often to the detriment of the public at large").
252. NISKANEN, supra note 251, at 38.
253. See Mashaw, supra note 47, at 4-5 (describing the modern transformation of
Niskanen's model to focus on a broader range of players and structures).
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influence. 254 Justice Stephen Breyer made his own contribution,
observing that bureaucrats tend to overregulate concerning rare,
high-profile risks.255 The common theme was that bureaucrats' incentives
drove them to overregulate. 25 6
Indeed,
the field was
dominated
by an anti-regulatory
predisposition. 257 In the 1970s and 1980s, it was popular to refer to

"regulatory capture," not as governance of the regulator by the
regulated, 2S8 but as prestige-seeking bureaucrats and public interest
groups collaborating to over-regulate the hapless private sector at the
public's expense. 259
These conservative anti-regulatory public choice theorists developed
their critiques with financial and quality-of-life regulation in mind. 26 0

Their models did not always fare well under scrutiny, and had poor
success at predicting actual agency behavior in those areas. 261 The
result 26 2 is what is typically meant today when an agency is said to be

254. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1986) (arguing that traditional social cost
and benefit is often distorted within agencies by bureaucrats' bias for their own missions).
255. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIoUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK

REGULATION 9-11 (1993) (describing quality-of-life regulators' tendency to overregulate
high-profile, low probability risks); Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be
Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 142-43 (2016).
256. Although Niskanen focused on the inefficiency produced by bureaucratic incentives,
this became conflated, in the minds of reformers, with the assumption that these
bureaucrats were, at the same time, overregulating. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.

Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263-64
(2006) (calling for a reform of the Office of Management and Budget's review).
257. See id. at 1261-62 ("OMB's advocates were frank that its primary function was to
create a 'rebuttable presumption against regulation' in order to curb agencies' supposed
instincts to overregulate .... ").

258. See id. at 1284.
259. See id. at 1264-65 (discussing Reagan's supporters' promotion of centralized review
of agency decision making in order to promote "coordinated and cost-effective regulatory
state" and to curb excessive regulation); DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 254, at 1081-82
(arguing that requiring cost-benefit analysis would "force regulators to confront problems
of . . . overzealous pursuit of agency goals, which experience has shown to be common in

regulatory programs"); Kagan, supra note 9, at 2279 ("Proponents of [Reagan's executive
review process] stressed the need . .. to guard against regulatory failures-in particular,
excessive regulatory costs imposed by single-mission agencies with ties to special interest
groups and congressional committees.").

260. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 256, at 1289 (criticizing agencies for failing to
prioritize health and safety in rulemaking).
261. See id.
262. See generally id. at 1282-1304 (arguing that the public choice assumptions about
bureaucratic incentives often do not hold up when the behavior of quality-of-life regulators
is examined).
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"captured."2 63 Moreover, as James

Q. Wilson observed of the FBI,

domestic agencies
do not always behave as empire-building,
budget-maximizers-in fact, they actively avoid regulating in some
instances. 26 4

However, there is plenty of evidence that the 1970s fable of the
empire-building, overregulating bureaucrat urged on by a small group of
pro-regulatory private firms is generally accurate with respect to
immigration enforcement. As we have noted, ICE and CBP-with the
approval and urging of the White House, their unions, and private
2
contractors-have continued to escalate their hyper-regulation. 5

B.

The Players

Immigration enforcement is a complex regulatory game in which an
unusually large number of entities, both public and private, exert

influence. 266 Public choice models of U.S. government regulatory
activities typically include the following players: the regulating agencies,
the regulated entities, the President, the Congress, the courts, and the
American public. Often models will also include public interest
organizations and any other institutions seeking to influence the

267
products of the regulatory process.
Immigration enforcement is unique because the players are so widely

distributed, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal distribution is
the number of players across the same level of government, while vertical

268
distribution is the number of players at multiple levels of government.
For example, environmental regulation is a two-level game because the
federal enforcement regime relies upon, at least in part, the policy choices

263. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REvESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
How CosT BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH

1340 (2008) (listing sources and their definitions of regulatory capture); Nicholas Bagley,
Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (defining capture as a "shorthand for the
phenomenon whereby regulated entities wield their superior organizational capacities to
secure favorable agency outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public").
264.

See JAMES

Q.

WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS

AGENTS 169-70 (1978); see also Levinson, supra note 41, at 932-34 (discussing
empire-building in the context of non-elected government officials).
265. See supra Section I.C.
266. See TICHENOR, supra note 36, at 1-36 (discussing the range of institutions and
political interests with influence on the immigration policymaking process).
267. See Mashaw, supra note 47, at 5-6 (discussing the broadening of recent public
choice models); id. at 19-20 (describing various public choice models).
268. See generally Jens Newig & Oliver Fritsch, Environmental Governance:
Participatory,Multi-level-and Effective?, 19 ENv'T POL'Y & GOVERNANCE 197, 199 (2009).
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of state government. 269 Defense policy is also a two-level game because
the U.S. government faces both domestic and international political
pressure. 270

With respect to immigration enforcement, U.S. executive branch
entities-the President, the DOJ, ICE, and CBP-do most of the heavy
lifting in law creation. At the federal level, they share regulatory power
with the other components of the immigration bureaucracy, Congress,

and the federal courts. But they must also contend with the policies of
foreign, state, and local governments. 271 Foreign governments seek to
affect the outputs of the U.S. immigration enforcement system with
respect to their own citizens, in the way that Iran successfully pressured

the Carter and Reagan administrations to terminate its citizens' visas
during the resolution of the 1979 Hostage Crisis.272 State and local
governments also affect immigration enforcement law and policy in a
number of ways. 273 The federal enforcement regime depends in part on
their cooperation-they are expected to share information about, arrest,

and detain enforcement targets, for example. 274 But they may also seek
to magnify or disrupt federal policy by enacting their own complementary
or competing enforcement regimes or by refusing to cooperate. 275
Immigration enforcement is therefore a four-level regulatory game, in
which the U.S. government must respond to international, national,

state, and local politics.

269. See Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2001) (speaking of
the Surface Mining Conservation and Recovery Act ("SMCRA") as a statute embodying "a
'cooperative federalism,' in which responsibility for the regulation of surface coal mining in
the United States is shared between the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and State regulatory
authorities").
270. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (discussing the political complexities of international
negotiations world players face in balancing domestic and international interests).
271. See TICHENOR, supra note 36, at 889 ("Immigration control represents an area of
government action that intersects domestic and foreign policy."); Cu6llar, supra note 11, at
85 (observing that the United States, like many other nation-states, responds to external
pressures from the international system as well as domestic institutions, interests, and
public priorities).
272. See Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 1982); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653
F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1360-61 (9th Cir.
1980).
273. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 983, 986-89 (2016) (discussing the role of states and local municipalities in shaping
immigration law and policy).
274. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and The Future of Immigration
Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2012).
275. See infra Section II.C.4.
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Private entities also influence immigration enforcement law and
policy. On the side of indiscriminate enforcement are the unions

representing ICE and CBP bureaucrats and the private contractors who
supply the agencies with equipment and operate facilities where
immigrants are detained. 276 Opposing indiscriminate enforcement are
public interest organizations and attorneys who represent and advocate

for the rights of immigrants, private corporations seeking to maintain or
expand the labor pool, and certain pockets of USCIS, such as the USCIS
Asylum Officers. 277
The immigrants themselves are also, of course, significant players in
278
But their role is often discounted
the immigration regulatory game.

because their power is weak compared to regulated entities in other
regulatory spaces. Unlike broadcasters lobbying the FCC or
manufacturers lobbying the EPA, for example, most recent immigrants
possess few resources and little clout to influence policy in the commonlyunderstood manner. 279 Nonetheless, their incentives and behavior can
have a profound effect on the success of immigration enforcement
policy. 280
C. The Parties'PowerDynamics and Incentives
These parties come with varying capacities to influence policy and

different levels of interest in doing so. In general, among the parties with
a high level of interest in the outcome, the parties favoring greater
enforcement have more influence than those favoring restraint, resulting
in a process that encourages both political resilience and hyperregulation. 28' And the constraints the parties have imposed on one
another have led to hyper-regulation-indiscriminate, pervasive, and
performative-dominating policy. But the dynamics leading to these

276. See Ted Hesson, 15 Companies That Profit from Border Security, ABC NEWS (Apr.
15, 2013, 10:20 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/15-companies-profitborder-security/story?id=18957304; supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Section I.C.2.
278. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA
L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2017).
279. In general, the longer a particular immigrant community has existed in the United
States, the more pressure its members and representatives can exert on immigration
enforcement policy. See TIcHENOR, supra note 36, at 803 ("Government decisions to permit
the admission and relatively easy naturalization of new immigrants have had the effect of
introducing new groups with a decided interest to mobilize on behalf of admission policies
enabling their families and fellow ethnics to enter the country.").
280. See Frost, CooperativeEnforcement, supra note 278.
281. Other parties may have a high capacity to influence the outcome but lack the
incentive to exert pressure for a particular policy. See infra Section II.C.4.
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results are complex and not simply the product of the push-and-pull of
raw institutional power. The current immigration enforcement regime
emerged from the interaction of the parties over time, and functions in

ways that were not necessarily intended by the parties.
1.

The President and Congress

Among the three branches of the federal government, the President
wields the most power over immigration enforcement. This might seem
surprising at first. The Constitution explicitly vests Congress-and not
the President-with the power to regulate immigration. 282 From the
sheer prolixity of the immigration code, it might appear that Congress
has robustly exercised that power, tightly circumscribing executive

discretion over immigration enforcement. 283
But this is only true with respect to some aspects of ex ante control
over immigration.284 By periodically expanding the ways in which
immigrants are eligible for removal and stripping them of their
procedural rights, Congress has left the executive branch with vast
discretion over ex-post enforcement, which has an immense impact on
determining the composition of the immigrant population. 285 Congress
has also further empowered the President by continuing to shower
budgetary resources on immigration enforcement. 2 86
Moreover, the courts have often hewed to a "plenary power doctrine"
under which they defer to congressional and executive authority over
immigration, particularly in matters concerning the admission or
removal of non-citizens. 287 Although the plenary power doctrine is often

expressed in ways that conflate the political branches' authority, long
stretches of congressional silence on the substance of immigration law
have enabled the President and the bureaucracy to benefit the most from
it and other forms of immigration exceptionalism, which we discuss

below. 288

282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
283. See Cox, supra note 274, at 55-56.
284. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive
Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1789-90 (2010).
285. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 133-37.
286. See id. at 133.
287. Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L.
REv. 77, 96-101 (2017) (arguing that "[nlowhere is the administrative exercise of
policymaking authority more evident than in the immigration context").
288. See id. ("Mhe power to promulgate national immigration policy is increasingly
exercised less by Congress, and more by the officials populating our nation's administrative
agencies.").
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Congress could, of course, intervene at any moment to reshape the

immigration code, requiring the executive branch to revamp the
immigration enforcement regime. But history suggests that significant
substantive congressional action on immigration requires an unusual
convergence of events: when immigration is a highly salient political

issue; when political incentives enable cross-party or strange-bedfellow
coalitions to form; 289 and when the President, responsive to the national

political environment, senses that the decision to sign reform legislation
would be popular. 290
Nonetheless, Congress has imposed significant constraints on
presidential authority over immigration enforcement in another way:

through institutional design. Legal scholarship emphasizing presidential
control over agency action often overlooks how Congress's institutional
design decisions may limit presidential authority by creating and
291
shaping agency culture in advance.

Congress's 2003 decision to split the INS into three parts and house
them in the new DHS, with the support of the George W. Bush
administration, has had a lasting and profound impact on immigration

law. It was the twenty-first century's only significant legislative act
regarding immigration. The HSA embedded the lion's share of the
292
immigration bureaucracy within the National Security State.
In his seminal work on bureaucracies, James Q. Wilson observed that

"the formative years of a policy-making agency are of crucial importance
in determining its behavior. As with people, so with organizations:

Childhood experiences affect adult conduct." 293 ICE and CBP were born
with national security missions and "grew up" during years when

antiterrorism responsibilities brought prestige, power, and money, and

289. See TICHENOR, supra note 36, at 233 ("[T]he dynamics of U.S. immigration policy
have long been influenced by the making and remaking of distinctive political coalitions on
this issue that cut across familiar partisan and ideological lines.").
290. See generally id. (describing the influences shaping immigration legislation in
American history).
291. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination,129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429-30 (2015)
[hereinafter Nou, Intra-Agency] (concluding that "fixed legislative and executive design
choices" impose costs that may discourage agencies from making procedural changes). But
cf. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 215-17 (2015) (describing
presidential efforts to circumvent fixed institutional limits by using agency authorities in
combination).
292. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 275, 291, 521 (2019); Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an
Administrative Law Context: The Dejd Vu of Decisional Disparitiesin Agency Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 483-84 (2007).
293. See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 68.
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indiscriminate immigration enforcement became the norm. 294 USCIS's
service mission, by contrast, never fit well in this new bureaucratic
realm, leaving it with second-class status and depriving it of influence.
The Obama administration's late efforts to use the USCIS to counterbalance the enforcement agencies' influence were, therefore, severely
constrained by Congress's institutional design decisions from a decade
earlier. 295 Thus, the USCIS was vulnerable to being co-opted for the
national security mission in the Trump administration. 296
2.

The President and the Bureaucrats

In general, public choice theory predicts that a president's policy will
gain traction at an agency only to the extent it aligns with the agency's
goals and, more importantly, its bureaucrats' core tasks. 297 An agency's

goals are defined by Congress via statute, by the President via executive
orders or similar commands, and by its high-level bureaucrats via
guidance or rulemaking. Core tasks are what front-line bureaucrats do
on a daily basis. 298 In determining how an agency will respond to external
pressure, an agency's core tasks are more important than its assigned
goals or bureaucrats' individual preferences because agency culture is
formed in large part by those tasks-agency culture is "a persistent,

patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human
relationships within an organization." 299 It is "passed on from one
generation to the next" and "changes slowly, if at all."300

The clarity and breadth of an agency's goals will affect the degree to
which mid-level and lower-level bureaucrats' incentives influence how
core tasks are defined. This is because an agency's leaders must spend
their time dealing with external forces and do not typically have the time

or energy to redefine the agency's goals or its bureaucrats' core tasks.30 1
When an agency has a narrow set of clearly-delimited goals,
bureaucrats are more likely to adopt core tasks related to those goals,

and the agency's political leadership is therefore more likely to be able to
influence the definition of core tasks. But in an agency with conflicting

294.

See WADHIA, supra note 37, at 3 ("In the decade after 9/11, agency officials and

policymakers were loath to use 'prosecutorial discretion' or related tools to focus resources

on high priorities and instead preferred to enforce the immigration law at all costs.").
295. See supra Section I.C.2.
296. See Rabin, supra note 51, at 162-64.
297.

See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 91.

298.
299.
300.
301.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 32.
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or vague goals, the bureaucrats' incentives will play the prominent role
in determining the agency's set of core tasks, and the bureaucrats will

embrace policies that enable them to more easily perform those tasks
while shirking responsibility for carrying out policies that require taking
on new tasks.30 2
The old INS was a classic example of an agency with vague and
conflicting goals. 303 But even the post-2003 agencies, ICE and USCIS,
have broad mission statements that reveal the inherent tension between
immigration enforcement as ensuring a fair process and immigration
30 4
enforcement as protecting national security and preventing terrorism.
The latter focus has come to dominate because a national security

mandate has a uniquely transformative effect on an agency. It carries a
special vagueness that invites mission creep and the devolution of rules

into standards.30 5 In other words, a national security mandate lays the
groundwork for bureaucratic incentives to determine an agency's core

tasks, rather than Congress, the President, or even the agency's
leadership.
In the absence of narrow and clearly-defined goals, James Q. Wilson
concluded, a handful of factors are most likely to influence how front-line
bureaucrats determine the agency's core tasks: (1) "the impetus given to
the organization by its founders"; (2) "the array of interests in which their

agency is embedded"; (3) the problems front-line bureaucrats encounter
daily in their work; and (4) peer expectations.

306

302. See id. at 222 ("Changes consistent with existing task definitions will be accepted;
those that require a redefinition of tasks will be resisted."); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to
Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 6, 9, 17-30 (2009) (observing that agencies "will systematically overperform on the tasks
that are easier to measure and have higher incentives, and underperform on the tasks that
are harder to measure and have lower incentives"); cf. Nou, Intra-Agency, supra note 291
(discussing barriers to agencies implementing procedural and organizational changes).
303. See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 158 (observing, in 1991, that the INS
had "been conspicuous for its weak sense of mission and low morale" chiefly because "it
[had] vague and competing goals"); supra Section I.A.
304. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
305. See Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalismand the Creationof
Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 61, 71 (2014) (discussing mission creep at the
FBI after it received a national security mandate from the President); Jonathan Hafetz, A
Problem of Standards?:Another Perspectiveon Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141,
2144 (2016) (observing that national security bureaucracies take vague grants of authority
as "invitations to develop broad and malleable standards" and "strip rules of their ordinary
meaning, causing their sub rosa transformation into standards").
306. See WILSON, BUREAUcRAcY, supra note 6, at 27; Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic
Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 193 (2018) (noting the
importance of peer expectations in driving bureaucratic behavior, especially in national
security settings).
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As we discussed in Part I, the impetus for the creation and early
development of ICE and USCIS was to tether immigration enforcement
to the rest of the national security state in the years after 9/11.307 ICE
was born as a counterterrorism agency in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, imbuing it from the start with a strong national security
mandate and mission. 308 Both agencies are embedded within a parent

agency and an enormous national security state with the same mandate
and mission. 309
Indiscriminate immigration enforcement is also attractive for a
number of strategic and political reasons. When bureaucrats seek to
handle the problems they encounter daily, they will settle on tasks that
increase agency autonomy. Bureaucrats will also seek prestige and
greater authority, but not at the expense of autonomy. This accounts for
why agencies sometimes lobby to defeat reforms that would expand their
authority if it overlaps with other agencies'; why agencies will seek to
carve out a niche by performing tasks not performed by other agencies
and corner the market on those tasks; and why agencies are generally
wary of joint or cooperative activities. 3 10
Wilson's observations about autonomy

account for why ICE's

bureaucrats have settled on a certain set of core tasks and why they
heavily resisted efforts by the Obama administration to alter those tasks.
On a daily basis, the major problem ICE bureaucrats face is that the
agency has the resources to deport just a small percentage of
unauthorized immigrants.3 11 Moreover, a small subgroup of those
unauthorized immigrants actually engage in criminal activity or

represent national security threats. 312
Despite efforts to shift enforcement priorities during the Obama
administration, ICE bureaucrats have settled on, and rarely depart from,

a set of core tasks aimed at the goal of indiscriminate deportationremoving the greatest number of unauthorized immigrants, period.3 13
This means drawing on the latest surveillance technology to attempt to

307.
308.
309.

See supra Section I.A.4.
See id.
See supra id.

310.

See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 193-95.

311. See Cu6llar, supra note 11, at 13.
312. See Anna Flagg, Is There a Connection Between Undocumented Immigrants and
Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/upshot/illegalimmigration-crime-rates-research.html.

313.

See supra Section I.C.1; cf. Nou, Intra-Agency, supra note 291, at 473 ("[T]he career

incentives and training of civil servants usually orient them toward perpetuating the

stability of their institutions, rather than embracing administrative innovations .... ").
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314
monitor the enormous pool of unauthorized immigrants. It also means
arresting, detaining, and deporting as many as possible when
opportunities present themselves-regardless of whether the target is a
315
The
U.S. military veteran or is apprehended at a school or courthouse.

turn

toward

indiscriminate

and

pervasive

enforcement

is

also

performative because it is believed to advance the ultimate goal by
deterring future unauthorized immigration
316
deportation."

and encouraging

"self-

ICE could have responded to its central problem in a different way.
It

could

have

prioritized

certain

unauthorized

immigrants

for

deportation-those with violent criminal histories, for example-or
shifted the lion's share of its resources to disrupting cross-border criminal
gangs and human-trafficking networks. The latter is, in fact, the core
mission of HSI, the lesser-known subdivision of ICE that has consistently
found its budget commandeered by ERO and its activities drowned out
by the agency's overall emphasis on indiscriminate immigration

enforcement. 317
Part of the reason that HSI's work has been subordinated within ICE
to that of ERO is that it operates on turf already occupied by other law

enforcement

agencies,

such as the FBI and DEA, and requires

318
Rolling up human trafficking and drug
cooperation with them.
seem a more prestigious law enforcement
might
networks
smuggling
activity than deporting millions of non-criminal immigrants, but
indiscriminate enforcement dovetails with a strain of populist anti319
immigrant sentiment that has always undergirded American politics.

Transnational criminal enforcement does not offer the same cathartic
release for the portion of the United States population that feels
alienated by demographic change.320

314. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2014).
315. See supra Section I.C.1.
316. See id.
317. See id.; infra Section III.A.
318. See Andrew Grossman, FBIAgents Say Rivals Encroach on Their Turf, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 26, 2014, 7:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-agents-say-rivals-encroach-ontheir-turf-1409095148 (describing turf wars between the FBI and HSI and conflicts
between their respective cultures).
319. See ZOLBERG, supra note 63, at 432-33; Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supranote 55
(noting the recent political salience of nativism).
320. Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Departmentof Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 309-10 (2013) ("Agencies ... tend to choose the
goals that are more easily measured so they can demonstrate progress. This often means
taking an approach that focuses on short-term concerns with tangible outputs, as opposed
to long-term effects that might be harder to predict and quantify .... "); cf. Cuellar, supra
note 11, at 71 ("In a political environment of rising concern about immigration and strong
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in contrast, offers an efficient and

dependable way of boosting ICE's autonomy and prestige. The FBI, for
example, has neither the legal jurisdiction nor the inclination to deport
non-criminal immigrants-that is an enforcement activity falling
squarely within ICE's domain. 321 In addition, identifying whether an
immigrant is authorized or unauthorized requires far fewer resources
than undertaking an additional quasi-adjudicatory process to determine,
based on numerous factors, whether a particular unauthorized
immigrant is a high or low priority for removal. 32 2 Under an
indiscriminate deportation policy, an ICE agent can simply issue a
charging document or removal order and move on to the next target. 323

Moreover, the same incentives also encourage performative and
pervasive enforcement methods that constitute hyper-regulation.
Displays of raw power address directly the fears of anti-immigrant
constituencies, just as they do in the ordinary criminal justice context. 324
Family separation and conducting raids at schools may bring notoriety

to ICE, but such tactics also inspire the agency's supporters in Congress
and among the public-for a segment of the United States population,
the ICE agent who deports every undocumented immigrant he
encounters is a hero.

The bureaucrats at ICE and USCIS are not automatons, of course.
Each individual brings to her role previous experiences and values, 325
and every bureaucracy is populated by a range of types. There are
bureaucrats who work to advance an agency's core tasks, shirk them, or

affective responses to the perceived erosion of sovereignty, the marginally simpler policy

argument of fortifying the border is likely to have greater resonance among unsophisticated
but concerned voters than the more complex idea of shaping the demand for migration
through multiple regulatory strategies.").
321. The FBI is not above using deportation as leverage over, for example, informants.
See, e.g., Wadie E. Said, The TerroristInformant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 710 (2010).
322. See Rabin, supra note 11, at 238 (observing that an ICE agent's decision to deport
is "considered an agency 'win' and a job well done" while exercising prosecutorial discretion
and dismissing a case "would require a messier and unfamiliar adjudication of conflicting
factors, and could place the agent and/or the agency under fire"); Nou, Intra-Agency, supra
note 291, at 435 (noting that resource constraints drive agency decisions about which
procedures to adopt).

323. See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text; see also Christopher J. Walker,
Administrative Law Without Courts, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1630 (2018).
324. See Mary De Ming Fan, DiscipliningCriminalJustice: The PerilAmid the Promise
of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 27-28 (2007) (observing that law enforcement
"policy professionals have realized that it is more feasible to address the effects of crime,
such as fear and outrage, rather than crime itself" and as a result, "policy has become about
risk and resource management and expressive penal measures").

325.

See Ingber, supra note 306, at 164-65.
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sabotage them. 326 There are bureaucrats who resist the agency's current
policies or a change in policy through a variety of means-enlisting the
327
help of internal "offices of goodness" such as inspectors general,
seeking outside allies such as congressional staffers, leaking damaging
information, going public, quitting, slowing down procedures, or internal
advocacy. 328
Moreover, an agency's culture is rarely monolithic. As Joseph Landau
has observed, the immigration enforcement bureaucracy has, on occasion
329
in the past, actually developed pro-immigrant norms. Sub-agencies can
have distinct sub-cultures, as with HSI and ERO. Many HSI officers have
become so frustrated by the dominance of ERO within ICE that they
asked in June 2018 to be spun off.33o
One might also think that immigration enforcement agencies would
ground for shirkers, saboteurs, and resisters because so much
fertile
be
of immigration enforcement law and policy is made by mid-level and
331
Indeed, the low
frontline bureaucrats exercising vast discretion.
priority ICE gives to investigating employer infractions could be seen as
332
a form of shirking.
Nonetheless, the sub-units of DHS that qualify as "offices of
goodness" 333-designed to identify and address unlawful activity and
abuses of power by ICE and CBP-are quite weak. Inspector General
334
reports criticizing agency policies have been ignored, and DHS's Office
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has been largely ineffective at inducing

ICE or CBP to change its policies. 335 Complaints of civil and human rights
33 6
violations by ICE agents often go unanswered, much less addressed.
326. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 21 (John E. Jackson & Christopher H.

Achen eds., 1997).
327. See Schlanger, supra note 28, at 54-55 (defining "offices of goodness" and subsidiary
agencies created by Congress or the President to instill in the parent agency "particular ...
values that are important to the [creator] but less than central to the [parent]").
328. See Ingber, supra note 306, at 164-65; Jennifer Nou, BureaucraticResistance from
Below, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), https://yalejreg.com/nc/
bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/.
329. See generally Landau, supra note 10.
330. See Letter from Nineteen HSI Special Agents, supra note 150.
331. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
332. See Rabin, supra note 11, at 241.
333. See generally Schlanger, supra note 28.
334. See Yuki Noguchi, 'No Meaningful Oversight':ICE ContractorOverlooked Problems
at Detention Centers, NPR (July 17, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/17/741181
529/no-meaningful-oversight-ice-contractor-overlooked-problems-at-detention-centers.
335. See Schlanger, supra note 28, at 84-88.
336. See, e.g., Susan Ferriss et al., Homeland Security's Civil Rights Unit Lacks Power
to Protect MigrantKids, NPR (Aug. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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In addition, the profile of a typical ICE bureaucrat helps account for
why the level of shirking, sabotage, and resistance at the agency is
probably low. First, peer expectations-another factor James Q. Wilson
noted influences how bureaucrats settle on core tasks-are especially
important in law enforcement and military organizations. 337 Because
ICE is a law enforcement body with quasi-military characteristics, its

bureaucrats are more likely to be influenced by their peers' expectations
than bureaucrats at other types of agencies. 338 Second, agency workforces
are largely self-selecting, and ICE is no exception. 339 Its agents are more
likely than bureaucrats at the EPA, for example, to be politically
conservative, to prioritize strict enforcement of immigration laws, and to

resist political pressure from the White House to change policy. 34 0 Third,
because ICE is a young agency and turnover is high, its bureaucrats are
less likely to question the focus on current core tasks than holdovers
clinging to different priorities from earlier eras. 341 And finally, by settling
on that small set of core tasks aimed at indiscriminate deportation and

zero tolerance, ICE has sidelined the work of certain professionals at the
agency, such as lawyers, whose training involves drawing subtle
distinctions and whose outside obligations might compel them to

constrain the agency's exercise of discretion. 342 These factors together
reinforce the strong sense of mission at ICE surrounding its core tasks.
USCIS, by contrast, is a far less cohesive agency with a weaker sense
of mission. It has among its ranks a far greater number of bureaucrats

shots/2019/08/02/746982152/homeland-securitys-civil-rights-unit-lacks-power-to-protectmigrant-kids.
337. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 45-48; Rabin, supra note 11, at 225.
338. See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 49; Stephen Lee & Sameer M. Ashar,
DACA, Government Lawyers, and the Public Interest, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1893-94
(2019).
339. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 687-89.
340. See id.
341. See Rebecca Kaplan, Homeland Security Has a Serious Employee Retention
Problem, CBS NEWS (last updated Sept. 22, 2014, 2:45 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/homeland-security-has-a-serious-employee-retention-problem/.
342. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 60 ("[P]rofessionals are those employees
who receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow
practitioners located outside the agency."); id. at 53-54 (observing that professionals at an
agency who lack a well-defined role will be motivated by, among other things, professional
standards); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1995) (arguing that
agency lawyers should be responsive to politics); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule,
Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1055-56 (2011) (contending that
limited judicial review and vast discretion "tend[ to empower politics at the expense of
expertise and, especially, law").
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343
with experience serving immigrants rather than deporting them.
USCIS bureaucrats are also much more likely to have represented

immigrants as lawyers or advocates. 344 Some came to the roles during the
Obama administration or even the old INS era, when the enforcement
and service missions enjoyed something closer to equal weight. Finally,
because the agency is funded by application fees rather than
congressional appropriation, its leaders can exercise more independence
from pro-enforcement political interests.345
As a result, what a USCIS bureaucrat sees as her core tasks will vary
greatly, depending on the geographical jurisdiction of the office and the

individual's previous experience and values. 346 Because USCIS's primary
role is adjudicatory, rather than investigative, professionals such as
lawyers are more likely to draw on their training and professional values

to influence the decision-making process. These may be reasons
President Obama housed his new DACA program within USCIS. Faced
with ICE's open resistance to exercising favorable prosecutorial
discretion in removal cases, President Obama created a categorical
prosecutorial discretion program that could be implemented by USCIS
instead of ICE.347
Under these circumstances, USCIS represents a potential source of

resistance to ICE's indiscriminate deportation policy. The Asylum Office,
in particular, has resisted President Trump's efforts to have asylum
seekers wait outside the United States while their cases are
adjudicated. 348
As a whole, however, USCIS's weak sense of mission has left it
vulnerable to influence from the White House and the bureaucratic
349
Despite potential shifts in White
context in which it is embedded.

House policy, the bureaucratic context tends to support ICE's core tasks
and undermine resistance to them. Like ICE, USCIS is located within

the DHS, a parent agency with a national security mandate and
mission.3 5 0 And also like ICE, DHS as a whole engaged in a post-9/11

scramble with other law enforcement, defense, and intelligence agencies
to maintain its autonomy by carving out its own operational niches. ICE's

small set of core tasks are a better fit with its parent agency's national
343. See supra Section I.C.2.
344. See supra Section I.C.2.
345. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 682-83.
346. See supra Section I.C.
347. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 685-87.
348. See supra Section I.C.2.
349. See WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 82 (noting the importance of the
bureaucratic context in driving bureaucrats' incentives).
350. See supra Section I.C.2.
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security mission than USCIS's more varied and immigrant-friendly set.

In this bureaucratic landscape,

ICE became zealous and USCIS

vulnerable to cooptation by its more singularly-focused counterpart.

3.

The Courts and the Bureaucrats

Compared to bureaucrats, courts have limited power to impact
deportation and exclusion.351 Some of the limitations were self-imposed
by federal courts over time. 352 Other limitations were imposed by
Congress on the federal courts and immigration courts, or by the
President on the immigration courts.3 53
Ostensibly, immigration judges preside over removal cases. However,
their authority and discretion are severely constrained. First, the

majority of removal cases do not even go before immigration judges. 354
Instead, Congress has created several species of truncated removal
processes that sidestep immigration courts, allowing removal based on

an official's mere say-so. 355 In FY 2017, approximately 76% of all removal
orders were issued through two of these fast-track processes:
"reinstatement of removal" or "expedited removal."35 6 Recently, the
Trump administration announced a vast new expansion of expedited

removal, 357 and, if the courts allow this expansion to take effect, the
number of cases reaching immigration courts will represent an even

smaller percentage of the total. Moreover, Congress has attempted to
eliminate or drastically curtail judicial review of these types of cases,
making it unlikely that a court will ever get involved in the majority of

removals.35 8

351. See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 805, 814-16 (2015) (observing that the involvement of multiple agencies in
immigration adjudication further limits the effectiveness of judicial review).
352. See Catherine Y. Kim, The President'sImmigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 15-18
(2018).
353. See id. at 16, 38-39.
354. See id. at 5-6.
355. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181, 197-99 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportationand the
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE. & L. 1, 6-7, 22-25 (2014).
356. See KATHERINE WITSMAN, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFF. OF IMMIGRATION
STAT., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2017 12 (2019), https://

www. dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf.
357. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35409 (July 23, 2019).
358. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (West 2005) (preventing federal courts from
reviewing expedited removal orders or the decision to apply expedited removal to a noncitizen); id. § 1252(e) (barring challenges to the system of expedited removal except in a
certain narrow form and venue); id. § 1252(g) (barring courts from reviewing decisions by
the government "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
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Second, in the minority of cases that do go before immigration courts,
Congress has acted to limit the power of Immigration Judges (IJs) to
grant relief from removal. Before 1996, IJs had considerable discretion to
waive grounds of removability based on positive discretionary factors,

such as length of residency in the United States, hardship, or family
ties.359 That year, Congress passed a series of immigration reforms that
both broadened the grounds for removal, and also limited the discretion
360
In doing so, it transferred authority from the
of judges to stop removal.
"enforcers."3 6 1
its
to
"adjudicators"
system's
36 2
The
Next, IJs also lack decisional independence and resources.

immigration court backlog has now reached over a million cases, in large
part due to an overemphasis on enforcement at the expense of
adjudication.3 63 IJs need smaller caseloads, more training, and more

clerks. 364 Rather than respond to the backlog with more resources, the
administration has imposed quotas that require IJs to decide 700

365
At the same
removal cases per year-or approximately two per day.

time, the Attorney General has exercised his ability to certify cases to
himself from the Board of Immigration Appeals to limit the ability of IJs

to terminate, close, or continue cases, pushing IJs to issue removal orders
instead. 366 This political control of IJs is another way in which the courts
367
are subverted to the enforcement bureaucracy.

Immigration courts operate outside the procedural norms that
govern most other courts, limiting the ability of judges to constrain

prosecutorial excess. First, the exclusionary rule does not apply in
366
removal proceedings except in truly "egregious" cases. As a result, it is

against any alien under this chapter"); id. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (barring federal courts from
reviewing discretionary agency decisions).
359. Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 676-77
(2015).
360. Id. at 677-78.
361. Id. at 714.
362. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the
ImmigrationAdjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 576 (2011).
363. American Bar Association, 2019 Update Report: Reforming the Immigration
System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in
the Adjudication of Removal Cases 6 (Mar. 2019), [hereinafter ABA REPORT], https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commissionon_immigration/2019_re

forming the-immigration system-volume_2.pdf.
364. Family, supra note 362.
365. ABA REPORT, supra note 363, at 2-11.
366. See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 290, 292-93 (A.G. 2018); Matter of
S-0-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464-65 (A.G. 2018).
367. Kim, supra note 352, at 3-5.
368. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). See generally Stella Burch
Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of

2020]

ZEALOUS ADMINISTRATION

799

difficult to contest removal proceedings even when they are based on
searches and seizures that would violate the Fourth Amendment in the
criminal context.3 6

9

There is extremely limited discovery in removal

proceedings, so it is difficult to determine whether ICE has instituted
removal proceedings based on discriminatory or otherwise unlawful

grounds. 370 There is no right to appointed counsel, so even if there were
discovery, many non-citizens in removal lack advocates to help them
challenge executive overreach. 371 Non-citizens in removal proceedings
are often held in detention, which is extremely difficult to challenge, and
being detained exacerbates the difficulty of immigration court litigation
in all ways. 372 For pro se individuals, the "complexity, harshness, and

opacity of immigration law" make effective litigation nearly
impossible. 373
Given the limitations of immigration courts, some might seek to
challenge executive overreach in federal court instead. However, a
variety of legislatively-constructed and judicially-constructed doctrines

limit non-citizens' ability to collaterally challenge unlawful action in the
removal context. 374 Most notably, the plenary power doctrine insulates
much governmental action concerning deportation and exclusion from
review. 375 As if that were not enough, a variety of jurisdiction-stripping

statutory provisions

limit federal court review. 376 Doctrines

like

Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. REv.
1109 (2008).
369. David Gray et al., The Supreme Court's Contemporary Silver PlatterDoctrine, 91
TEX. L. REV. 7, 27-31 (2012).
370. See Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration
Court, 79 BROoK. L. REV. 1569 (2014).
371. Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122
YALE L.J. 2394, 2401 (2013).
372. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of MandatoryImmigration Detention, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 601, 619-26 (2010) (describing the various doctrinal and logistical
difficulties with challenging immigration detention in federal court).
373. Family, supra note 362, at 567.
374. Peter Margulies, Noncitizens' Remedies Lost?: Accountability for Overreaching in
ImmigrationEnforcement, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2011).
375. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1059-60 (1994); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law
and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 555-56 (1990).
376. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (West 2005) (preventing federal courts from
reviewing discretionary agency decisions); id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (barring review of final
removal orders against many non-citizens with criminal convictions); id. § 1252(f) (limiting
courts from enjoining removal proceedings except with respect to an individual non-citizen);
id. § 1252(g) (barring courts from reviewing decisions by the government "to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this

800

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:749

administrative exhaustion
roadblocks.377

and qualified immunity offer yet more

To be sure, the courts have occasionally intervened to block especially
378
Non-citizens have often done best
egregious constitutional violations.
when indirectly asserting rights, such as by invoking the rights of
citizens impacted by immigration decisions, applying a "procedural

surrogate" for a constitutional right, such as a traditional discovery rule,
or relying on a "phantom norm"-a regulatory or statutory right that

substitutes for a constitutional one. 379 Nevertheless, the powerful
combination of statutory, doctrinal, and practical limitations prevent

judges, in most respects, from serving as a meaningful check on
presidential action or the immigration enforcement bureaucracy.
Although immigration litigation is abundant, most removals proceed
38 0
untouched by judicial review.

In most agencies, the prospect of judicial review forces regulators to
381
But
engage in more robust deliberation and create a thorough record.
rights
process
due
few
immigrants-have
entities-the
when regulated
and the regulators-ICE and USCIS-face little prospect of meaningful
judicial review, the lawyers have less influence and the bureaucrats are

empowered. 382 Agency culture and politics, therefore, play a greater role
in decision-making.

4. The Other Players
The immigration enforcement regulatory game has many other
players. None has the same powerful combination of influence and

chapter"); see also Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999)
(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to foreclose review of a challenge to a pattern of
discriminatory enforcement).
377. See Margulies, supra note 374.
378. See, e.g., Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that courts have
jurisdiction to consider whether the First Amendment prohibits ICE from targeting
immigrants in retaliation for exercising their right to free speech).
379. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010).
380. See WITSMAN, supra note 356.
381. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
883, 886-87 (2014).
382. See Philip Hamburger, How GovernmentAgencies Usurp Our Rights, CITY JOURNAL
(2017), https://www.city-journal.org/html/how-government-agencies-usurp-our-rights-1494
8.html ('By shifting lawmaking and adjudication into administrative agencies, progressives
enabled the government to avoid the paths that the Constitution established for binding
lawmaking and adjudication, including the Constitution's procedural limits on such
adjudication.").
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interest in the outcome that matches the bureaucrats. Still, these other
players do exert influence and have the potential to exert even more.
The

most

important

pro-regulatory

players

are

the

private

contractors, the employee unions, and the American public. As in other
areas of the national security regulatory space, the bureaucrats at ICE
are simpatico with the private contractors who supply their equipment

and even perform some of their activities, such as surveillance and
detention.383 A robust revolving door between the agency and the
contractors reinforces the shared sense of mission. 384 The contractors
want to sell the government technology that makes indiscriminate
enforcement policies easier to perform, and the bureaucrats want to buy
it. Some of the contractors have been supplying the military and local law
enforcement and are looking to expand the market for their products. 385
The employee unions reinforce ICE's pro-regulatory sense of mission
through aggressive lobbying and public advocacy. They are quick to
condemn any criticism of the agency's policies. 386 Like any other union,
they pursue their members' interests with Congress, the White House,
and the public.38 7
At first, it would seem that the American public would be an antiregulatory player in the immigration enforcement game. Polls show that
strong majorities support immigration generally and a path to
citizenship for unauthorized immigrants-positions at odds with ICE's
mission and policies. 388 And elections do sometimes turn on immigration
issues, 389 but voters supporting hyper-regulation, ICE, and CBP tend to
prioritize immigration far more than voters with a more nuanced view. 390
A key insight of public choice theory is that a highly-mobilized minority

383. See Knowles, Warfare, supra note 8, at 2005 (describing the influence of military
contractors on policymaking); Sarah Lamdan, When Westlaw Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal
Ethics in the Eraof Big DataPolicing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 265-80 (2019).
384. See Knowles, Warfare, supra note 8, at 2005.
385. See Hesson, supra note 276.
386. See Preston, supra note 172.
387. See id.
388. See, e.g., Polling Update: American Attitudes on Immigration Steady, but Showing
More PartisanDivides, NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM (Apr. 17, 2019), https://immigrationfor
um.org/article/american-attitudes-on-immigration-steady-but-showing-more-partisan-divi
des/.
389. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 12, at 1271-72 (noting that immigration "has
significantly shaped the past four presidential contests, and has played a leading, if not
decisive, role in several midterm elections for federal lawmakers").
390. See Kristen Bialik, State of the Union 2019: How Americans See Major National
Issues, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/04/

state-of-the-union-2019-how-americans-see-major-national-issues/.
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391
A
can exert more influence than an under-mobilized majority.
substantial constituency exists for ICE's current policies, and the agency

gains in prestige with that subset of the American public convinced that
unauthorized immigration presents a danger serious enough to merit
392
very aggressive measures.

Still, signs abound of growing resistance to ICE's policies among the
public. Family separation and horrific detention conditions have brought

393
A broad-based
attention to internal enforcement policies as well.

coalition has helped move ICE's policies to the center of political
debates. 394 Immigrants' lawyers have fought those policies in a variety of
395
As a
legal contexts, further raising the profile of enforcement issues.
mobilized
been
have
voters
of
pro-immigrant
numbers
significant
result,
by ICE's indiscriminate enforcement policy and have influenced state
and local governments to resist. A host of cities around the country-from

San Francisco to Chicago-have adopted policies limiting cooperation
with ICE enforcement. 396
Such pockets of federalist resistance have made it harder for ICE to
carry out its policies in some places, but to what degree is uncertain.
Neither this type of resistance nor public outrage and increasing

congressional oversight have, so far, influenced ICE to change its policies.
In fact, ICE's response has largely been to push back against its critics
and try to outmaneuver them by, for example, engaging in retaliatory
397
deportation and surveillance of immigration activists.
Other players in the immigration enforcement regulatory game
possess the potential to significantly influence the process, but lack

sufficient incentives to do so. U.S. companies benefit from hyperregulation because, as a result, they enjoy special leverage over their
3 98
They will tolerate the
employees who are unauthorized immigrants.

391. See Mashaw, supra note 47, at 2-8.
392. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 55, at 633 (observing that "political
polarization can push immigration policy to the extremes").
393. See, e.g., Lisa Riordan Seville, Hannah Rappleye & Andrew W. Lehren, 22
Immigrants Died in ICE Detention Centers During the Past 2 Years, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6,
2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/22-immigrants-died-icedetention-centers-during-past-2-years-n954781.
394. See, e.g., Molly O'Toole & Noah Bierman, Trump Will Pitch Immigration Plan
Already Facing Stiff Opposition in Congress, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://
2
www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-immigration-plan-jared-kushner- 0190515-stor
y.html.
395. See Ashar, supra note 21, at 1505.
396.

See generally Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 12.

397. See Cade, supra note 16, at 1442-46; supra Section I.C.1.
398. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibitingthe Employment of UnauthorizedImmigrants:
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 215 (2007); Michael Grabell & Howard
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occasional raid, so long as their punishment is a slap on the wrist.3 9 9
Foreign governments sometimes protest the treatment of their citizens
by the U.S. immigration bureaucracy, but such protests rarely, if ever,
escalate to meaningful pressure. 400 Several factors account for this.
Geopolitical power imbalances prevent many nations from being able to
influence U.S. policies that emerge from mission-centered bureaucracies,

especially regarding internal enforcement.401 Some nations remain
indifferent to the fate of emigres, whom they may view as undesirable. 402
Other nations play a double game, condemning abuses while continuing
to cooperate with the U.S. enforcement bureaucracy; their law
enforcement agencies and militaries typically have pro-regulatory
bureaucratic orientations similar to ICE's.403

The last, and oft-forgotten, players in the regulatory game are the
immigrants themselves, for whom ICE's policies are not a game at all,
but life-transforming and often life-threatening.4 04 Most immigrants,
even authorized ones, lack the power to push back against ICE's policies

because their legal status is too precarious.405 Even those with legal
representation face the strong headwinds of vast enforcement discretion

Berkes, They Got Hurt at Work-Then They Got Deported, NPR (Aug. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/16/543650270/they-got-hurt-at-work-then-they-got-deported.
399. See Cuellar, supra note 11, at 18 ("A generally functionalist account of immigration
law could pivot on the idea that perhaps the most relevant concentrated interestsemployers-are perfectly happy to keep in place a system that lets them squeeze value from
undocumented labor or workers with temporary H-lb visas, while maintaining (given the
problems with employer sanctions) a relatively low risk of sanctions by federal
authorities.").
400. Cf. Ernesto Hernandez-L6pez, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law:
TransnationalInfluences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1345, 1382 (2007) (describing Mexico's lobbying to alter provisions of draft legislation
and limited success).

401. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 39 (2005).
402.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION: "RECALCITRANT" COUNTRIES AND THE

USE OF VISA SANCTIONS TO ENCOURAGE COOPERATION WITH ALIEN REMOvALS (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IF11025.pdf.
403. See, e.g., Nick Miroff & Kevin Sieff, Trump Administration to Send DHS Agents,
Investigators to Guatemala-Mexico Border, WASH. POST (May 31, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-to-send-dhs-agents-investig

ators-to-guatemala-mexico-border/2019/05/31/25bb9fOe-83b2- 11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_sto
ry.html.
404. See Frost, CooperativeEnforcement, supra note 278.
405. See Frost, Alienating Citizens, supra note 22 (describing the Trump
Administration's "goal of restricting immigration into the United States and destabilizing
the position of all immigrants, whether undocumented or legally present, under its policy

of attrition through enforcement").
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and little due process protection. 406 Because the number of unauthorized
immigrants far exceeds the number ICE can deport, the best resistance
strategy for the deportable immigrant is to go into hiding-to avoid public

407
places and avoid cooperating with any type of law enforcement. This is

why immigrant communities turn into ghost towns when rumors of ICE
raids spread. 408 The indiscriminate enforcement policy, therefore,

damages the social fabric of these communities and makes it harder for
police to solve crimes. 409
III. TAMING ZEALOUS ADMINISTRATION

ICE's hyper-regulation is the product of its culture and the
institutional context in which it operates. It is a mission-driven national
security agency filled with committed adherents focused on a small set of

core tasks, bolstered by nativist politics and the lobbying of private
detention and surveillance industry profiteers-unchecked in most cases

by meaningful judicial review. 410 These conditions have made its
functioning a paradigmatic example of zealous administration.
In some contexts, the benefits of zealous administration may

outweigh the costs. Suppose Congress gives an agency a well-defined
mission delimiting a small set of core tasks, the performance of those

tasks does not allow much discretion, and the bureaucratic context
provides few opportunities for mission cooptation of other agencies.
Zealous administration by such an agency could be tolerated, even
encouraged.
But ICE is not such an agency-nor are CBP and the other four units
of the immigration bureaucracy. Hyper-regulation by such a massive

apparatus endowed with broad discretion to set crucial national policy
not only imposes heavy social costs, but it also runs contrary to key rule-

406. See id.
407. See Cindy Carcamo, Giulia McDonnell, Nieto del Rio & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, ICE
(July 14, 2019, 4:00
Raids Keep Some Hiding Inside, Afraid to Be Out in Public, L.A. TIMES
9 7
PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ice-raids-fears-201 0 14-story.html.
408. See id.
409. Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized
Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 627-28 (2015).
410.

See What We Do, U.S. IMMIGRATION

AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT, https://

www.ice.gov/overview (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); Tess Owen, The Trump Administration
is Pushing Nativist Immigration Politics on the Nation's Sheriffs, VICE (June 21, 2018,
11:56 AM), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/zm87p9/the-nations-sheriffs-are-getting-aheavy-dose-of-nativist-immigration-politics-from-fair; Sunny Kim, Private Prison Firm
Quietly Ramps Up GOPLobbying Efforts as Trump Expands ImmigrantDetention Centers,
CNBC (Oct. 4, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/04/private-prison-firmramps-up-lobbying-amid-trump-immigration-crackdown.html.
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of-law values and general principles of administrative law. Zealous
administration is rarely stable, but tends to grow over time.411 Escalating
hyper-regulation creates instability in the law, producing damaging

uncertainty and unpredictability. 4 12 It also makes the rules that are
created difficult to understand and often impossible to follow.41 3 In
addition, this laser-like focus on a narrow band of Congress's statutory
mandate while neglecting other aspects raises serious questions about
whether ICE is a faithful agent of the legislative principal or a "rogue

agency."414 ICE's political resilience makes it far less responsive and
accountable to the President and the public-qualities generally believed
to be important in an administrative agency. 415 And mission cooptation
spreads all of these problems to other agencies.
Zealous administration tends to be durable: without some major
intervention, future presidents will have little success reining it in.
Moreover, there is little reason to believe it will not spread to other areas

of regulation. The immigration enforcement bureaucracy's present may
be the federal bureaucracy's future.
A key question, therefore, should be how to reconstitute ICE and

similar agencies to contain the phenomenon of zealous administration.
There is a growing movement to abolish ICE,416 but there has been little
discussion about what would happen after.4 17 The United States is
unlikely to be a country of open borders in the foreseeable future, and, as
long as that is the case, there will be a need for some governmental
organization to perform the function of immigration enforcement.
Controlling

zealous

administration

requires

confronting

its

structural causes and trying to change them. Some, like the agency's
culture and the prevalence of particular political memes, like nativism,

411. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of AdministrativeLaw, 131
HARv. L. REV. 1924, 1927 (2018).
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. Lee & Ashar, supra note 338, at 1894-95.
415. See Kagan, supra note 9 (describing presidential control of agencies as a form of
political accountability); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975) ("Increasingly, the function of administrative law
is . . . the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation of a
wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision.").
416. Sean McElwee, It's Time to Abolish ICE, NATION (Mar. 9, 2018), https://
www.thenation.com/article/its-time-to-abolish-ice/
[https://perma.cc/PP9Y-MKPA];
Ella
Nilsen, The List of Democrats Calling to Abolish ICE Keeps Growing, VOx (June 30, 2018,
2:26
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/29/17518176/democratstoabolish-ice-movement-gillibrand-de-blasio-ocasio-cortez [https://perma.cc/6VJK-U9VU].
417. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Abolish ICE ... and Then What?, 129 YALE L.J.
FORUM 130 (2019).
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are very difficult to address. Other solutions, like creating a meaningful
check on agency power, limiting the force-multiplying influence of private
contractors, and reducing an agency's ability to coopt other agencies, are

more viable. There are probably multiple ways to achieve these ends. The
proposal set out in this Part presents a menu of options, each of which
might help, particularly if combined with others.
A.

Structural Changes

ICE is not an agency with a singular mission. It includes two separate
sub-agencies: ERO and HSI.418 ERO implements the indiscriminate

419
the much
deportation policy that has received much public attention;

less visible HSI, in contrast, is charged with protecting immigrants from
20
As ERO's work has come to
trafficking and transnational crimes.4

dominate the budget and reputation of ICE, HSI's work has become
secondary. This is due in part to its placement within a national security

agency created in the wake of a terrorist act committed by foreign
nationals. DHS's national security mission aligns much more with that
of ERO than HSI; therefore, ERO dominates ICE policies and coopts the
other domestic immigration sub-agency, USCIS. One means of
addressing this issue would be to relocate ICE, or at least USCIS.
Bureaucratic reshuffling of this magnitude would come with a
substantial cost, and that cost would need to be weighed carefully against
the gains from containing a zealous governmental agency.

There are a number of options for structural reform. In the 1980s and
1990s, several analysts urged the creation of a new cabinet-level
immigration agency that combined the immigration-related functions

performed by a slew of other of agencies: Labor, State, Health and
21
A new Department of Immigration
Human Services, and Justice.4

would presumably house some version of ICE as well as USCIS, along
with other sub-agencies dedicated to border enforcement, refugee
resettlement, humanitarian relief, and immigrant labor. It should be

418. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF'T,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEc., https://www.ice.gov/ero (last updated Aug. 2, 2019)
[hereinafter Enforcement and Removal Operations]; see also Homeland Security
Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF'T, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,

https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last updated Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Homeland Security
Investigations].
419. See Enforcement and Removal Options, supra note 418.
420. See Homeland Security Investigations, supranote 418.
421. See Gene McNary, No Authority, No Accountability: Don't Abolish the INS, Make it
an Independent Agency, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1281 (1997); MILTON D. MORRIS,
IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 141-42 (1985); Papademetriou et al.,

supra note 31, at 509.
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constituted with a mission embracing economic and humanitarian goals
for regulating immigration, in addition to national security and law

enforcement.4 22 A broad mission that places appropriate emphasis on the
range of immigration goals might reduce the ability of a zealous
immigration enforcement sub-agency to infect its counterparts.

On the other hand, despite the fact that the old INS was charged with
a diverse set of tasks, enforcement usually dominated.4 23 Avoiding a
similar fate for a new immigration agency would require careful
attention to its structure, funding, and leadership. If immigration
enforcement were too big a part of the agency's budget or staff, or if the
agency's overall leaders were drawn too regularly from the enforcement
sub-agency, enforcement might come to predominate over service, just as
it did for the INS. In any event, political influence and private contractors
may push the agency in that direction. One option for limiting this
influence might be to create a politically independent office charged with
making immigration policy, as the Federal Reserve does with fiscal

policy.
Alternatively, ICE might be contained by transferring it to a broader
law enforcement agency, like the FBI. One risk of housing immigration
enforcement within a criminal law agency would be to validate the sense
that immigration violations, which are largely civil, 4 24 are crimes.
However, for better or worse, immigration and criminal law increasingly
intersect, 425 and placing immigration enforcement within a criminal law

enforcement agency could lead to a more rational prioritization of
immigration cases because the agency's leadership would need to assess

422. Historically, policymakers have identified a range of goals and tasks for
immigration regulators. For example, the 1990s' Commission on Immigration Reform
stated, "Properly-regulated immigration and immigrant policy serves the national interest
by ensuring the entry of those who will contribute most to our society and helping lawful
newcomers adjust to life in the United States. It must give due consideration to shifting
economic realities. A well-regulated system sets priorities for admission; facilitates nuclear
family reunification; gives employers access to a global labor market while protecting U.S.
workers; helps to generate jobs and economic growth; and fulfills our commitment to
resettle refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian protection of the persecuted."
U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 143, at 24.

423.

MORRIS, supra note 421, at 131.

424.

Laura

Jarrett,

Are

Undocumented Immigrants Committing a

Crime? Not

Necessarily, CNN, (Feb. 24, 2017, 8:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/
undocumented-immigrants-not-necessarily-criminal/index.html.
425. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing MigrationThrough Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 135-36 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, ProsecutingImmigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1281, 1351 (2010); C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernandez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1457, 1467 (2014); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471
(2007).
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how to allocate resources for addressing illegal entries and visa overstays
alongside drug trafficking, terrorism, cybercrime, and violent crimes.
Separating ICE from USCIS might also limit the extent to which USCIS's
operations are coopted for immigration enforcement.
Another option might be to move USCIS to a different parent agency.
In the late 1990s, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform urged

that the service functions of the INS be moved to the State
Department. 426 The Commission noted that the State Department
already had a substantial docket of immigration adjudication because it
427
Moreover, the
was (and remains) responsible for issuing visas abroad.
Commission wrote that moving immigration services from the
Department of Justice to State "sends the right message, that legal
immigration and naturalization are not principally law enforcement

problems; they are opportunities for the nation as long as the services are
properly regulated." 428 The report generated significant discussion,
including a number of unsuccessful legislative efforts to restructure the

agency to separate out the INS's enforcement and immigration services
functions. 429
B.

Strengthening JudicialReview

There is a lack of judicial review of immigration enforcement at
multiple levels: first, the internal review process for immigration

enforcement action is weak and often nonexistent; and second, the
federal courts are constrained from fully reviewing and supplementing
that weak process. 430 Bolstering both of these forms of judicial review
could serve as one of the most effective checks on zealous immigration
enforcement.
There is a debate within literature relating to public choice theory as
to whether strengthening judicial review will address problems of agency
capture. 431 When it comes to zealous administration, though, agency

426.

See U.S. COMM'N ON

IMMIGRATION

REFORM, supra note 143, at 151.

427. Id. at 162.
428. Id.
429. See H.R. 3904, 105th Cong. (1998) (dividing the INS responsibilities into an
enforcement arm housed within DOJ and a benefits agency housed within State); see also
H.R. 2588, 105th Cong. (1997) (removing enforcement from the INS and placing it into a
new sub-agency of DOJ).
430. See supra Section II.C.3.
431. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33-35 (1991) (arguing, contrary to numerous other prominent
legal scholars cited in the article, that interest group theory does not justify more stringent
judicial review because courts are as subject to capture by special interests as legislatures
and agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism
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capture is only a small part of the problem; it is the agency's own culture
and other internal dynamics that drive it to zealotry. 432 Judicial review
is likely to be one of the best counterweights to these dynamics; a variety
of commentators have noted the capacity of judicial review to encourage
thoughtful and rational decision-making, and to counter bias.4 33 This
literature seems particularly apt to the phenomenon of zealous
administration, which involves the culture-driven exertion of raw power

in regulation, rather than deliberation. Greater judicial oversight of ICE
could lead to a more rational immigration enforcement regime in which

the agency would be required to create a thorough record and generate
robust contemporaneous reasoning in support of its rules and policies. At
a minimum, it would better assure that the agency complied with
procedural and substantive requirements before removing a person from

the United States.
There have been numerous proposals for improving the quality of
immigration courts-for example, increasing their independence and
adopting procedural mechanisms already used by other administrative
courts, such as rules of discovery.4 3 4 For purposes of countering ICE's
zealous administration, the best reform would probably be to increase the
immigration courts' independence, perhaps by making them an Article I

After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 229-30 (1997) (arguing that public choice
provides a justification for probing judicial review "within a narrow range of controversies
where each of the contending positions is represented by a group with significant [but not
necessarily equal] organization strength, and only when the outcomes reached in these

circumstances will not be trumped by a legislated solution").
432. See supra Section I.C.
433. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret

Statutes, 2013 WIs. L. REv. 411, 438 (2013); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1205-06 (2003); Mark
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490, 547-48 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs
and Benefits of Aggressive JudicialReview of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527 (1989)
("Aggressive [judicial] review serves as a powerful ex ante deterrent to lawless or irrational
agency behavior.").
434. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 363; LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER,
ENHANcING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION passim

(2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timehn
ess-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf;
APPLESEED
&
CHI.
APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION

COURTS 25 (2009), https://www.appleseednetwork.org/uploads/1/2/4/6/124678621/assembly
H.
Stephen
_line_injustice-_blueprint to_reform_americas_immigration courts.pdf;
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 passim (2010)
(recommending converting immigration judges into A.L.J. and replacing appellate review
by a new, Article III Immigration court).
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court like the Tax Court. 435 As long as the IJs operate simply as
employees who report directly to the Attorney General, they will be
especially susceptible to mission cooptation.
Giving immigration courts the power to contain over-zealous ICE
enforcement will require authorizing them to issue orders that compel
and even sanction ICE officers and attorneys-authority that, for the
436
It also ideally would involve restoring
most part, they currently lack.

much of the power that immigration courts once had to grant
discretionary relief from removal. Currently, immigration courts are
constrained in many cases by rigid and arcane laws from preventing
deportations of persons who have a lengthy history in the country,

437
extensive family, and otherwise have highly-sympathetic cases.
President Obama attempted to prevent such deportations by setting out

priorities for removal and mandating that ICE exercise prosecutorial
discretion. 438 ICE resisted that effort and now pursues an indiscriminate
439
As
deportation policy endorsed by the current administration.

4 40
Professor Nina Rabin has noted, ICE is a poor administrator of equity.
It would be far better to vest equitable power in the courts by granting

them greater authority to grant discretionary relief from removal.
Of equal importance is the strengthening of federal judicial review

over immigration enforcement. In 1996, Congress imposed a series of
441
Despite these
bars to federal court review of immigration cases.
influence on
exert
to
continued
roadblocks, the federal courts have
immigration courts, especially during a period after the administrative

review at the Board of Immigration Appeals was "streamlin[ed],"
meaning that the Board effectively abdicated its responsibility to review
442
As a result, there is an
a large number of immigration court cases.

435. See ABA REPORT, supra note 363, at 6-8.
436. For example, immigration courts lack the power to enforce subpoenas. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.35(b)(6), 1287.4(d) (2020) (requiring an IJ to refer a case to a United States attorney
for enforcement). If an immigration court orders an individual released who ICE contended
was subject to mandatory detention, ICE can automatically stay the court's order. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(i)(2) (2020).
437. See Cade, supra note 16, at 1431-39.
438. See supra Section I.C.1.
439. See supra Section I.C.1.
440. See Rabin, supra note 11, at 247.
441. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: CongressAttacks the Right to JudicialReview
of ImmigrationProceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1444 (1997).
442. Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume
Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (2018) (quoting Stacy Caplow, After the
Flood: The Legacy of the "Surge"of FederalImmigration Appeals, 7 NW. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y
1 passim (2012)).
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influential body of immigration law arising from federal court decisions,
which has a significant precedential effect on the Immigration Courts. 443
However, federal courts rarely, if ever, review removal orders entered
outside immigration court, and these make up the vast majority of all
removals.4 Review of expedited removal orders to the federal courts are
severely limited by statute,44 5 and the circuit courts have split on whether
the Suspension Clause requires that collateral review be left open via

habeas corpus. 446 The lack of meaningful judicial oversight of expedited
removal enables hyper-regulation, and improvements are needed. For
starters, the federal courts should be able to review legal issues
concerning expedited removal, such as whether immigration officers and
judges are applying the correct legal standard for assessing whether an

asylum seeker in expedited removal has a credible fear of persecution. 447
In addition, a person in expedited removal should be able to challenge
whether she properly falls under the expedited removal statute. Under
that statute, persons are subject to expedited removal if they have been
in the United States for less than two years, and the Trump
administration has now implemented expedited removal to the full

extent authorized by the statute. 448 It is easy to imagine persons who
have been in the United States for less than two years being improperly

subjected to expedited removal. At present, the only means to challenge
an erroneous finding is by filing a habeas petition in federal court-a

process that will be out of the reach for most of the predominately pro se
immigrants in expedited removal.49 A better process ought to exist for
them to easily seek review of an officer's finding in a factual hearing
before an Immigration Judge.
C. Limiting the Power of PrivateActors
Private actors play an important role in various aspects of
immigration enforcement.4 50 Some of these, such as interpreters for

443. Id. at 1128.
444. See Family, supra note 362, at 582.
445. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e) (West 2005).
446. Compare Castro v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016)
(non-citizen in expedited removal may not invoke the suspension clause), with
Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir. 2019) (noncitizen in expedited removal may invoke the suspension clause).
447. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 428 n.8; Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102.
448. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (West 2005); Designating Aliens for Expedited
Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 35409.
449. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e)(2) (West 2005). Filing federal court litigation to challenge an
expedited removal order will be extraordinarily difficult for most non-citizens.
450. Chac6n, supra note 69, at 4-18.
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immigration hearings, do little to influence policy. 4 51 However, a growing
coterie of companies specializing in surveillance and detention contribute
to zealous administration because it aligns with their economic selfinterest. 452 Not only do they lobby for spending on immigration
enforcement, but their operations are opaque and they are difficult to
hold accountable when they violate the law. 453 Reducing the influence of
these contractors and limiting their lobbying power might help contain
zealous immigration enforcement.

One solution might be to more broadly regulate the lobbying and
political activities of governmental contractors. Federal contractors are
already banned from spending federal appropriations to lobby for certain

purposes, such as the extension of a federal contract. 454 A broader ban,
such

as

one limiting

campaign

contributions,

might raise

First

Amendment concerns because the Supreme Court has found that strict

455
However, the rentscrutiny applies to restrictions on corporate speech.

seeking behavior of corporations negatively impacts the nation's
economic welfare because it leads to inefficiency in governmental
spending. 456 Controlling this economic distortion could be considered a
compelling governmental interest, and a properly drawn restriction
might also satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.457
Another option is to reduce privatization in the immigration
enforcement arena. The easiest target would be immigration detention,
which accounts for a very large and increasing share of the growing
4 8
The Obama administration had
immigration detention industry.

announced it would end private detention contracts (a decision reversed
by the Trump administration), so there is a precedent for doing so.459
451. See id. at 16-17.
452. Id. at 38-39; Roxanne Lynne Doty & Elizabeth Shannon Wheatley, Private
Detention and the Immigration Industrial Complex, 7 INT'L POL. Soc. 426, 427 (2013);
David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration
Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 224, 226 (2019); see Lamdan, supra note 383, at 27080.
453. Chac6n, supra note 69, at 39-41; see Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 452,
at 226.
454. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1352(a) (West 2012).
455. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). But see
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholding a state
ban on campaign contributions by state contractors).
456. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 198, 226-53 (2012).
457. Id. at 198.
458. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 452, at 225.
459. Franco Ordoiez, Did Companies'DonationsBuy a Trump Change in Private Prison
Policy?, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 3, 2017, 7:16 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
politics-government/article136339598.html.
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CONCLUSION

The President's ability to manipulate the executive branch
bureaucracy has been a central theme of administrative law scholarship
in recent years. 460 Recognizing the crucial role the immigration
bureaucracy plays in American governance, scholars have begun to
explore the President's relationship to that bureaucracy.4 6 1 Given the
special constitutional prerogatives the President enjoys in immigration
law, the relative weakness of judicial review, and congressional
paralysis, one would think that the immigration bureaucracy would be
fertile ground for presidential administration.
A closer look reveals that immigration regulation is actually a place

where presidential administration founders, along with other theories of
agency behavior developed with other regulators in mind. Instead, the
incentives of the immigration enforcement bureaucrats play a crucial, if
not the dominant, role in developing immigration law and policy. The
result is zealous administration. And public choice theory-which places
bureaucratic incentives at the center of analysis-therefore holds real
promise for accurately mapping how the immigration bureaucracy
functions and analyzing how it may best be reformed.
This Article offered a comprehensive public choice model of the
internal immigration enforcement agencies. This model should be

complicated by future assessments. But it also may point the way to reexamining accounts about other areas of regulation-accounts that may
overstate the ability of the White House to change law and policy in the
teeth of bureaucratic incentives. It may be that zealous administrationin some form-is not so rare after all.

460.
461.

See generally Kagan, supra note 9.
See generally Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 38.

